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Increasing demands on water resources from growing populations and indus-
tries coupled with periodic, yet severe, drought have revealed vulnerabilities in water
supplies around the world. However, in some locations, partnerships between water
rights holders (such as the agricultural sector) and those with water needs and avail-
able capital (such as the energy sector) could improve water efficiency. A market
with cross-sectoral participation that creates incentives for reduction of fresh water
consumption could improve water availability for many stakeholders. This work lays
out the methodology of evaluating these hypotheses with an original water and cost
model that is developed and demonstrated using three case studies in the Lower Rio
Grande Basin, the Brazos River Basin, and the Permian Basin in Texas with the
intent that the findings would be generally applicable to other regions. This work
uses an integrated, geographically resolved allocation model to evaluate water mar-
ket participants and management strategies that could be implemented to encourage
water demand reductions to supply new water users. Best practices are evaluated
for increasing water availability through market mechanisms based on costs, benefits,
and technological viability. The work closes with a discussion of regional variations
to this integrated approach. Results of this analysis show that, in the Rio Grande
vi
Basin, up to 900 million gallons per year could be made available through 15% wa-
ter conservation in irrigation areas. The water would supply approximately 30% of
the annual hydraulic fracturing demand for 2016 and 2017 in the area. Reductions
would also improve reliability for irrigators. In the Brazos Basin, results show that
low-cost conservation scenarios could lead to savings of up to 4.1 billion gallons of
water per year with mixed effects on reliability and resilience in the basin. The price
paid for water used in oil and gas operations would not offset conservation strategies
in every scenario, but agriculture and some municipal strategies are available. In the
Permian Basin in West Texas, results show that a market heavily reliant on centrally
treated flowback and produced water would reduce water management costs and offset
approximately 9 billion gallons of fresh water consumption annually. These transac-
tions show that water could be provided without increasing total supplies through the
combination of consumptive water conservation strategies and market mechanisms.
Third party effects and transaction costs need to be fully evaluated, though. More-
over, spurring these saved water transactions might require incentives at the regional
or state level.
vii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Dwindling water supplies, change in climate, and increased demand on re-
sources due to population and industry growth have increased water stress world-
wide [36]. Water conservation is one option for mitigating water stress concerns.
Incentives made clear through water markets could help finance investments in water
conservation and link savings to new demands.
In some parts of the world, the agriculture sector makes a good candidate for
investments in water efficiency, conservation, and management because it uses sig-
nificant volumes of water for a relatively small overall portion of economic activity,
and often has outdated, inefficient equipment. In other parts of the world, other
water users might make good candidates for investments in efficiency, conservation,
and management. For example, some municipal water systems experience large water
losses and could benefit from capital investments to reduce loss for use in other pur-
poses. Similarly, the oil and gas sector could reduce its own fresh water consumption
through use of alternative water sources at an overall cost savings. Because oil and
gas companies have significant capital to invest, because they require large quanti-
ties of water to fracture wells, and because they are willing to pay a higher price
for water than water purchasers in other sectors, they can stimulate the market for
water in each of these sectors, altering the current allocation and implementation of
management practices used for efficiency, reuse, or recycling.
1
To assess the feasibility of investments in water savings, an analysis is con-
ducted of the water market in Texas and the impact of the water demand for hydraulic
fracturing in that market. This work explores four research questions:
1. can reductions in fresh water consumption accomplished through improved wa-
ter management make significant volumes of water available for other purposes,
2. which water use sectors (agriculture, municipal, or thermoelectric power) are
best suited to conserve water with the intent to sell to other users,
3. could a network of available treated flowback and produced water economically
supply oil and gas sector water demands, and
4. if the energy sector or other high-value water use sector makes cross-sectoral or
intra-sectoral investments in fresh-water-lean systems, can their water demands
be fulfilled at a cost offset by the price paid for that water?
This work analyzes these research questions through four objectives:
1. develop an integrated framework including policy assessment, evaluation of par-
ticipants, and allocation of water
2. apply the framework to an active surface water market,
3. apply the framework to a limited surface water market, and
4. apply the framework to a groundwater market.
Objective 1 involved generating a mixed-methods model that incorporates
pricing, costs, water supply and allocations, and technological advances into an in-
tegrated, geographically-resolved hydrologic process to determine water conservation
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potential through a combination of technical and market solutions. Trends and price
impacts are relevant to the prospects for innovations in water efficiency since under-
standing the underlying dynamics is useful for identifying the potential for engineer-
ing solutions to mitigate the various water-related challenges. The original water and
cost model is developed and demonstrated in objectives 2–4 in the Lower Rio Grande
Basin, the Brazos River Basin, and the Permian Basin in West Texas.
This dissertation augments the existing literature by combining these methods
in an environment of previously unseen high marginal prices associated with energy
extraction, cataloging the effects of this sustained, high-priced marginal user in the
process. Because water supplies in many areas of the world are expected to increase in
stress in the future, it is important to analyze the effect of new, high paying users and
the ability of regions to react in ways that preserve supplies for future users within
existing or, potentially, adjusted policy frameworks. Reducing consumptive water use
could be a response to the increase in marginal price. Basins could make use of the
high marginal price of water through investments in water saving infrastructure.
1.2 Organization of This Document
The organization of this dissertation includes background on the design of mar-
kets and examples of consumptive fresh water conservation (Chapter 2), methodology
for the integrated, geographically-resolved hydrologic model used to assess fresh water
consumption reduction within a market (Chapter 3), demonstration of the model’s
use in the Lower Rio Grande Basin (Chapter 4), the Brazos River Basin (Chapter
5), and the Permian Basin in West Texas (Chapter 6), a discussion of results (Chap-
ter 7), and conclusions (Chapter 8). Supplementary information is included in the
appendices.
3
Chapter 2
Background
Water extraction in many of the world’s rivers is reaching unsustainable levels
and continued supply of water of adequate quality for human and productive needs is
threatened [39]. Continued scarcity of water has the potential to restrict agricultural,
oil and gas, and electricity production. Water planners use a range of approaches to
mitigate water scarcity concerns [171]. For example, the Texas State Water Plan (the
recurring planning document that compiles regionally proposed water management
strategies for a 50-year period) includes direct potable reuse, groundwater desalina-
tion, seawater desalination, aquifer storage and recovery, drought management, direct
reuse, new groundwater wells, indirect reuse, municipal and irrigation conservation,
new major reservoirs, and water transfers [21]. This dissertation does not go into de-
tail about these strategies. This work examines how cross-sectoral and intra-sectoral
water exchanges involving water conservation and efficiency could make water avail-
able for more users. However, it should be noted that this potential solution is one
of many strategies available for mitigating water stress [171].
The importance of the work in this dissertation lies in determining potential
areas for collaboration through water savings and trades while also highlighting po-
Some sections of this chapter were previously published in M. Cook et al., “Who Regulates It?
Water Policy and Hydraulic Fracturing in Texas,” Texas Water Journal, vol. 6, pp.45–63, 2015. and
M. Cook and M. Webber, “Food, Fracking, and Freshwater: The Potential for Markets and Cross-
Sectoral Investments to Enable Water Conservation,” Water, vol. 8, p. 45, 2016. The author of
this dissertation contributed to the previously published work by designing and performing research
under the guidance of the co-authors, Karen Huber and Michael Webber.
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tential unintended consequences and gaps in incentive alignment. The research in
this dissertation builds on work in multiple fields. This chapter is intended to provide
background on water exchanges in a market environment and on best practices for
water conservation and efficiency in the irrigation, municipal (including home and
public landscaping), thermoelectric power, and oil and gas sectors. The information
in this chapter provides the basis for an analysis of the potential for and effects of
trading saved water in a high marginal price environment outlined in Chapter 3.
2.1 Water Allocation Policies and Regional Water Manage-
ment Strategies
2.1.1 Surface Water Allocation Policies
Managing shared water resources will be important to ensuring adequate sup-
plies for water needs. Lack of access to water is exacerbated by resource scarcity and
water allocation policies [171]. Surface water management today generally falls under
three categories: riparian, public allocation, and prior appropriative rights [40]. In
the United States, surface water allocation laws are generally split across the 100th
meridian: the Eastern states have more water supplies and tend to use riparianism or
regulated riparianism and the Western states generally use prior appropriation [41].
Under a riparian system, ownership comes with land that borders flowing
streams, and water rights are not separable from that land [42]. Instead, water is held
in common with other property owners [42]. Under Riparian water law, common in
eastern states, shortages are shared equally among landowners adjacent to the water
source [43].
Public allocation involves administered distribution of water [40]. Water is
owned by the state and in trust for its citizens [42]. Its use is regulated based on
public interest. Individuals hold the right to enjoy the use and advantages of water,
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as long as the use is deemed beneficial and reasonable [40]. Water use is subject to
oversight by the state [40].
Under Prior Appropriation Doctrine, a permit to withdraw water is based not
on land ownership but on the point in time at which the permit or “water right” was
acquired [43]. Appropriative water rights are subject to state regulation of beneficial
use and permitted priority withdrawal [42]. The system is often simplified as “first in
time, first in right” because, upon application, a permitting authority gives a water
right holder a priority date and an allocation amount that resides with the water right
as long as it remains valid [171]. Thus, water shortages fall on those who last obtained
a legal right to use the water. Water rights are not attached to land ownership [42].
Because appropriative rights exist separate from land ownership, they can be bought,
sold, leased, or transferred [171].
Texas surface water is owned by the State of Texas and held in trust for its
citizens but is allocated under the Doctrine of Prior Appropriation [171]. However,
these water rights have limitations. Interbasin transfer is allowed but restricted [171].
Users must apply for and receive a water right or amendment to a permit [44]. The
right is then junior in priority to rights granted before the time the application is
accepted [44]. Moreover, the priority system is often termed “use it or lose it” because
rights holders must use their entire volume or lose their right to it [171]. The system
often encourages wasteful water use [42]. A market would allow potentially unused
water to be leased to another water user under the original water right, creating an
economic incentive to conserve where one might not have existed previously [171].
The seniority rule of prior appropriation often favors senior license holding irrigation
users [45].
Water rights in the Lower Rio Grande, below the Falcon-Amistad reservoir,
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differ from those on other rivers in Texas in that they are allocated on an account
basis in which the Water Master, the arbitrator of water rights in this basin, records
withdrawals and subtracts use from allocated accounts [46]. Rights for municipal uses
are set at one priority level in which allocations renew on a yearly basis while irrigation
rights are set at another level in which balances carry forward into the next year [46].
Thus, irrigation accounts are more constrained than municipal accounts [46]. Surplus
in the Falcon-Amistad reservoir for any given month is allocated to the irrigation
users [46].
2.1.2 Groundwater Allocation Policies
Groundwater regulation also includes correlative rights, reasonable use, and
the rule-of-capture [43]. Correlative groundwater rights, similar to riparian surface
water rights, attach groundwater ownership and use to land ownership [43]. Water is
allocated proportionally to land ownership. The State of California uses correlative
rights to allocate groundwater. Reasonable use doctrine also attaches groundwater
ownership to land ownership. Reasonable use does not allocate a certain amount of
water but requires that water be used beneficially [43]. The rule-of-capture attributes
the right to withdraw groundwater to the landowner residing above that water and
providing that, absent malice or willful waste, landowners can withdraw as much
water as they want without incurring liability, even if that withdrawal will inhibit
access to water by neighboring landowners [47].
Because groundwater is a property right, it can be bought, sold, or traded [171].
However, lack of a specific allocation of water complicates any market environment.
Groundwater is a classic common-pool resource, making management difficult due to
the competing interests of the users [41]. If use is unconstrained, each user could freely
pump as much water as they pleased [48]. Individual pump irrigators have no incentive
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to leave water in the ground for future use due to knowledge that neighbors might
exploit or sell the shared water beneath their land [40, 49]. As a result, groundwater
users have a tendency to extract water at a rate greater than recharge of the aquifer,
also known as mining the aquifer [40,49]. Such extraction leads to externalities such as
lowered water table leading to increased pumping costs, land subsidence, degradation
of water quality, and exclusion of other potential irrigators from access to water due
to lower supplies and higher costs [40]. The rate of extraction is also caused by the
view that the present value of water is greater than its future value [51]. Producers
often underestimate future value, though, leading to more extraction to maximize
short-run profit [52]. Because of the underestimated value of groundwater in place in
an exhaustible aquifer, producers and society benefit from limiting annual withdrawal
of that groundwater [53].
2.2 Water Markets as a Means of Reallocating Water
Augmenting current water supplies has been the traditionally preferred method
of water managers for dealing with water shortages [56]. However, some of the water
could be used more productively than its current use through water markets and
water trading [54]. Because water markets provide incentives for efficient allocation
compared to other strategies [54]. Effectively transferring water to users who value
the marginal water more increases total net benefits produced by the waters use [57].
Water markets exist around the world and in many western U.S. states. In
Chile, property water rights have contributed to growth in the agricultural sector [54].
In Spain, market changes led to increases in regional income [55]. In Australia, water
trades in the Murray-Darling Basin raised the value of water use and mitigated against
drought [54]. Models in Alberta show measured gains in allocative efficiency from
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water transfers within and across the sub-basin [45].
Markets could provide benefits to water users, providing economic reallocation
of scarce water among irrigators, industries, and households [58]. Compared to other
forms of reallocation of water, markets empower water users, requiring consent to any
reallocation of water and payment when water is transferred [40]. During drought,
markets provide options to transfer water to meet demand, avoiding the increased cost
of providing new sources [59]. Market transactions could provide system reliability
by generating incentive to use transferred water rather than depleting storage [59].
Markets could also be used to transfer water to satisfy instream flow constraints [59].
In addition to reallocating water to other users, markets induce water users to consider
the value of their water and the opportunity cost of its use, providing incentives
to use water efficiently or invest in water-saving technology and reap the benefits
themselves or sell the saved water [40]. However, markets have downsides, particularly
in unregulated markets where third party effects are not addressed. Discussion of
these downsides is included in the following sections.
Since agricultural water rights make up the majority of water entitlements in
many water stressed basins, these rights play a central role in water reallocation [39].
Markets grant agricultural users flexibility to respond to changes in crop prices and
water values by allowing transfers when prices are more favorable [40]. At lower
prices, sellers of water are less willing but buyers, including other irrigators, are more
interested. Water price increases as water scarcity increases, raising the marginal
value of a unit of water [60]. Non-irrigation users tend to be able to pay high prices
for water [45]. In parallel, irrigation users might find it more profitable to sell their
water to non-irrigation users than to use it to grow crops [45,61].
Multiple types of water contracts exist, including those for temporary water
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(short-term leases) and permanent water (sale of water right). Markets for temporary
water are more common than those for permanent water [61].
To achieve efficient reallocation of water, ideal markets require well-defined
tradable water rights and no transaction costs. The property rights should be speci-
fied, exclusive, transferable, and enforceable [62]. Well-defined water property rights
“formalize and secure the existing water rights held by water users; economize on
transaction costs; induce water users to consider the full opportunity cost of water;
and provide incentives for water users to internalize and reduce many of the negative
externalities inherent in irrigation [40].”
However, water rights are often poorly defined and might have high transac-
tion costs [40, 59]. None of the allocations systems mentioned previously fulfills the
conditions for well-defined property rights to water. For example, under appropri-
ation systems, selling excess water might be used to show that water is no longer
needed for beneficial use and negating that part of the water right [63]. The physi-
cal properties of water enable weak property rights that raise the cost of measuring,
bounding, and enforcing individual claims [42].
In addition, an assumption of zero transaction costs does not hold true in
real-world markets for water rights [40]. Transaction costs include information, legal
fees, public agency review, technical studies, and conveyance–components that have
nonzero costs [40,59].
Regulatory authorities could aid in defining property rights and reducing trans-
action costs, providing support for private water rights exchange [42]. Authorities
could provide accurate demarcation of water rights and facilitate and monitor trade
activity. Groundwater could be unitized as is done with oil and gas to allow all par-
ties to share in net returns of selling water and eliminate competitive withdrawal [42].
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Unitization would require allocation of water supplies to the land and allow for pool-
ing those resources for use by one well, also allowing for payment to users whose
supply is withdrawn when that well is used. In addition, there might be public good
considerations warranting regulatory oversight of water exchanges to protect public
use [42]. Efficient reallocation of water requires better definition of water rights and
a regulatory role for the state in addressing externalities [42].
It is also important to monitor and mitigate effects on third parties in an effi-
cient market [40, 59]. Potential third party effects vary. For example, environmental
flows might be affected, changing fish and wildlife habitat; causing land subsidence,
overdraft, or well interference in aquifers; or degrading water quality [59]. In a rural
environment, farm workers, farm service companies, and downstream farmers might
be affected [59]. In an inefficient, unregulated market environment, third party ef-
fects might occur with little recourse for third parties. However, mechanisms exist
to address third-party concerns including requiring monitoring, public review and
regulatory approval; taxing transfers to compensate harmed third parties; requiring
additional provision of water for environmental purposes; and restricting transfers to
“surplus waters only [59]. These solutions increase the explicit cost of water transfers
for the buyers and sellers to reduce the impact on third parties.
In addition to concerns over property rights and transaction costs, concerns
exist over communication between users [171]. Negotiation of water trades might
not result in optimum solutions if parties do not believe the optimal solution is fair.
Highly dissatisfied parties might find certain solutions unfair and resist implementing
them (both) [64]. Factors such as lack of trust, information, and communication can
result in a tragedy of the commons [48]. Parties prefer to act based on individual
rationality as opposed to group rationality [64]. Sub-optimal solutions exist that
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might be perceived as fair according to all parties and will emerge as more stable [64].
It is important to ensure a stable solution [171].
2.2.1 Markets as Strategies to Reduce Fresh Water Consumption
Water conservation involves comparing costs and benefits to beneficially re-
ducing water use [67]. Conservation often involves behavior or management changes.
Water efficiency refers to a ratio of inputs to outputs and often involves changes
in technology to reduce water use [67]. This section will discuss conservation and
efficiency together and focus on reductions in unproductive consumptive water use.
Withdrawals of water refer to water that is taken from the basin. Withdrawals
that are discharged back to the basin at an acceptable quality are deemed non-
consumptive. Consumptive water use refers to withdrawn water that does not return
to the basin from which it was extracted. Consumptive water uses include transfer
to another basin, injection, sequestration, contamination, evaporation, incorporation
into plant biomass, seepage to a saline sink [68]. In areas where downstream and
future generations depend on the unconsumed portion of diversions, including return
flows and aquifer storage, investment in conservation could lead to water depletion
[69]. Focus on conserving consumptive water use avoids these externalities.
Many allocation systems value water use as a public good and make judg-
ments on its beneficial use, referring to the end use of the water but not whether
that water is used productively. Productive water use contributes to societal goals,
including production of goods and services [68]. Productive uses can include evapo-
rative losses if they contribute to crop health [68]. Unproductive consumptive water
uses include transpiration from weeds, evaporation from soils and irrigation canals,
and evaporation from poorly designed irrigation systems [68]. Reducing unproduc-
tive consumptive losses through conservation and efficiency would make surplus water
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available to be used by the existing user or reallocated to other users [68]. For exam-
ple, Gleick et al. (2011) reports that unproductive soil evaporation is 75-85% lower
with drip irrigation systems compared to flood irrigation during early-stage cotton
development [68]. That water could be allocated for more cotton production or to
other users in the area.
Because markets induce water users to consider the value of their water and
the opportunity cost of its use, they might also encourage users to save water with
the intent of selling that saved water to other users [40, 65]. Water could be saved
through expansion of water use by efficient new water users, adoption of water con-
serving technologies, and elimination of inefficient uses of water [60]. In addition,
users could transfer reclaimed or surplus water [59]. Urban areas have taken advan-
tage of this mechanism by financing improvements to irrigation districts, including
lining of irrigation canals [59]. For example, a 35-yr contract between Imperial Irriga-
tion District (IID) and Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD)
involves trading canal lining and other system improvements for saved water [59]. As
water moves to new uses, conservation could potentially lead to an improvement in
environmental flows, as well [66]
Trades for saved and surplus water must ensure that transferred resources
are real water rather than paper water [59]. Paper water is that numerated in a
water right. Real water is the supply that is actually received by the user [59] which
might be less than what is allocated on paper. Water users do not know how much
water they will receive because of seepage and environmental losses, withdrawals by
upstream users, and changes in flow over time [59]. A junior water right holder in
a prior appropriation system might not receive any of their allocation in a drought.
Ensuring real water arrives is a challenge to incorporate into market transactions.
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2.3 Water Consumption and Conservation in Irrigated Agri-
culture
Agriculture accounts for 80-90% of U.S. consumptive water use [70]. In 2007,
irrigated farms accounted for 40% of the value of U.S. agricultural production, a
total of $185 billion [70]. As of 2012, at least half of that irrigated farmland was
still irrigated with less efficient, traditional systems [70]. This section focuses on
options to reduce or conserve consumptive water through improved management and
technology.
Saving consumed unproductive water might require changes in management
practices, including at least one of the following goals:
• reducing the unnecessary evaporation or unwanted transpiration from soil or
supply sources [70–72],
• improving rainfall use with precipitation capture and moisture retention tech-
niques [70],
• restricting acreage or water use expansion in cropped areas [71, 72],
• switching to lower water-consuming crops [71,72],
• irrigating current crops at a deficit [70–72],
• reducing deep percolation water that becomes severely degraded in quality or
is uneconomic to recover [70], and
• reducing field runoff that is lost to the hydrologic system [70].
Potential irrigation efficiency opportunities lie in use of best management prac-
tices (BMPs) such as furrow dikes, which are small dams for each ridge between a
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planted row of crops; gated and flexible pipe to prevent seepage in irrigation channels
and furrows; recovery of irrigation runoff water (tailwater recovery); and brush man-
agement. More efficient gravity irrigation such as furrow gravity irrigated acres or
pipe or a lined open-ditch field water delivery rather than flood irrigation might save
water, as well [70]. The Texas A&M Agrilife Extension has also suggested improving
irrigation scheduling; developing improved irrigation water management practices;
adopting drought tolerant crop varieties; continuing conservation practices adoption;
and improving irrigation conveyance systems [73]. Other practices include monitor-
ing soil moisture and reducing evaporation [74]. Enhanced biotechnology, including
insect-, drought-, or herbicide-resistant crop varieties, could also save water. How-
ever, one study showed that use of biotechnology without water restriction did not
save water but could actually increase water use [75]. Improving system dynamics
without the users intent to reduce water use does not reduce water use. Furthermore,
users should be careful in conserving when considering water at a basin scale. For
example, drip irrigation is important for many reasons, including greater water pro-
ductivity and food security [76, 77], but the water saved might have been important
to other users downstream [78]. Similar to water markets, water conservation could
have third party effects.
Farmers might want to conserve for many reasons, including to improve prof-
itability through increased crop production [79], improved potential of meeting water
demands, or sale of saved water. The average value of production from irrigated
farmland was three times the average value for dryland in 2012 [70]. However, as
water supplies decrease and farmers transition to dryland farming, individual and
local revenues would suffer [80].
While BMPs might save water and improve profitability, irrigators still might
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be unwilling to implement them [171]. Many factors affect adoption of water ef-
ficiency mechanisms, particularly water price and farm finances, education, policy,
and water availability [171]. Farmers are also likely to implement irrigation efficiency
mechanisms on low quality land or if yield potential increased [81].
Water price has a direct impact on demand and secondary impact on choice
of efficiency measure and capital investments [81, 82]. Similarly, purchasing water
in water markets or other similar alternatives is cost effective compared to subsidies
for investments in improved irrigation efficiency [83]. However, farms in southern
Alberta have experienced challenges in implementing economic instruments to man-
age irrigation water because, as a concept, they have little support in the irrigation
industry [74]. Moreover, where cost of water is small percent of total farm budget in
Western Australia, investment is slow [74].
Most on-farm irrigation investment is financed privately [70]. However, capital
for long-term investment in irrigation efficiency might not always be available [82].
Colorado irrigators, for example, implemented when practical or economical, and in
Canada, surveys of two irrigation districts showed that farmers often did not imple-
ment water efficiency measures because of financial reasons [74]. Mechanisms that
are easier to implement and provide demonstrable effects often have financial rather
than sociological barriers while ones that require farmers to learn new skills also have
sociological bnesarriers like education [74].
Improved control and farmer education is needed for increased participation
in irrigation management [84]. A study in India found that training and education of
farmers, in addition to “changes in government policies such as rules and regulations,
pricing, institution building and infrastructure development” is needed to encourage
adopting water efficient cultivation methods [85]. Other research has shown farmers
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who adopt water efficiency mechanisms earlier are often younger, more educated, more
cosmopolitan, higher income, have larger farm operations, and receive primary sources
of information about the technologies or management practices [74, 82, 86]. Farmers
who have trialed a mechanism are also more likely to adopt [82]. Ultimately, farmers
are risk-averse; mechanisms involving existing knowledge and skills are adopted before
options that require costly, complex innovations [74]. A study in sub-Saharan Africa
recommended investment in clear education for adopters of drip irrigation, focusing
on repairs and maintenance [87].
2.4 Water Consumption and Conservation for Municipal Wa-
ter Use
2.4.1 Water Consumption and Conservation for Turfgrass
As of 2006, in the United States, there were about 50 million acres of turf
in residential lawns, athletic fields, golf courses, highway roadsides, cemeteries, and
parks [50]. Many studies have been conducted to determine how to reduce water
consumption for these turfgrasses.
Recommendations include applying deficit irrigation, or irrigation below a
crop’s maximum potential water demand but not low enough to result in a notice-
able change in appearance and quality [88–91]. Turfgrasses are able to tolerate some
deficit irrigation with little or no loss in turf quality because of their ability to form
deeper roots [92]. For example, a 1981 study found that applying irrigation to 80%
of field capacity reduced water use of Kentucky bluegrass by 20% and only reduced
quality by 10% [93]. For St. Augustine grass in Florida, a 2000 study found that no
substantial increase in quality is achieved beyond applying 75% of the maximum evap-
otranspiration (ET) capacity of turfgrass, and applying about 60% of the maximum
ET capacity yields acceptable [94].
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Soil management and water control systems have the potential to achieve this
reduced water application rate while maintaining turf quality. A 2009 study found
that soil management system based treatment produced good turfgrass while reducing
water use by 11-53% [95]. ET controllers with comparable settings also achieved good
turf quality, but ranged in water savings from -20% to 59% [95]. Finally, reducing the
irrigation schedule by 40% and using rain sensors produced 36-53% water savings [95].
A 2011 study found that installation of weather-sensitive irrigation controller switches
(WSICS) at athletic fields resulted in 121,000 gallons/acre/year of water savings in
Massachusetts [96]. Audits, retrofits, and WSICS use in homes also resulted in water
savings.
Management improvements could be made in addition to technological im-
provements. Higher mowing heights encourage deeper rooting, increasing turf survival
during droughts and reducing water loss through evaporation [97]. Water managers
and homeowners could also reduce area allowed for irrigation, limit watering days per
week, or upgrade to natural plants that require minimal irrigation [98]. Other best
management practices for turfgrass include hand watering, night watering, leak and
loss control, metering, wetting agents, and improved education [99].
Water Consumption and Conservation in Turfgrass in Homes
Outdoor irrigation in homes varies based on climate. In desert cities, about 60-
90% of water used by single-family residences is the landscape irrigation [100]. A study
of Texas found that about 31% of single-family residential annual water consumption
is dedicated to outdoor purposes [101]. Drier parts of the state generally use greater
proportions of water for outdoor purposes than wetter areas [101].
Choice of irrigation system plays a role in how much water is used. In-ground
and automatic systems generally use more water than irrigating manually. Homes
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with in-ground irrigation systems use 35% more water than homes without those
systems [102]. Homes that use automatic timers for irrigation systems use 47% more
water than those with in-ground systems operating them manually [102]. Operating
systems appropriately is also important. Staff at Austin Water Utility observed water
losses of 20-50% from inefficient irrigation system designor implementation [102].
Aside from implementing BMPs suggested in other parts of this chapter, home-
owners could replace turf entirely or partially through cash-for-grass programs or us-
ing native plants with little to no water demand in a process known as xeriscaping.
Xeriscaping could reduce water use by 20-53% in single family homes [100]
Water Consumption and Conservation in Turfgrass in Golf Courses
In the United States, golf courses maintain 1.5 million acres of turfgrass, about
80% of which are irrigated [103]. Golf courses use about 2 billion gallons of water
per day, about 0.5% of total water use in the United States [103]. In Texas, about
115,000 acres are estimated to be devoted to golf courses, compared to 1,608,399 acres
of landscapes and lawns [104].
The aesthetics of a golf course and, in turn, the management of water are
important to its revenue [105]. In a survey conducted in 2009, about 12% of U.S.
18-hole golf courses reported using recycled water for irrigation. Of those, about
37% were in the Southwest, and 24% were in the Southeast [103]. In addition, about
82% of golf courses reported using soil moisture observations while 3% reported using
soil moisture sensors. About 49% reported using weather forecasts, 18% reported
using evapotranspiration estimates form a weather service, and 17% reported using
ET estimates from an on-site weather station [103]. Golf courses could improve their
irrigation with improved on-site estimates of ET and soil moisture. In addition,
improved cultivars, adjusted mowing height, or other site-specific BMPs could be
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implemented. Improved cultivars resulted in water savings of 50% in Midwest golf
courses [106].
2.4.2 Policy Methods Used to Reduce Water Consumption
The best management approach is favored by water managers due to its basis in
science and incorporation of many possible solutions [107]. However, a 2002 survey of
turfgrass managers in California found that implementation of BMPs is often limited
by finances, education, and time [108].
Additional methods might be used at the municipal level to encourage reduc-
tion of water use. Two common methods are water pricing and the command-and-
control approach (water ordinances).
Economic Strategies to Reduce Municipal Water Consumption
Adjusting municipal water prices is generally assumed to be the economically
efficient method of reducing urban water use [109]. If the goal is to reduce water
withdrawals, using prices to manage water demand is more cost-effective than im-
plementing other non-price conservation programs due in part to the lower cost of
monitoring and enforcement [110]. Generally, residential demand is relatively inelas-
tic to price changes [111], and the time lag between use of water and impact of price
negates the power of price as a conservation tool. But increasing block rate price
policies do lead to consumer sensitivity and higher price elasticities than a standard
low price for water [112].
Water price is also the more efficient tool in allocating welfare associated with
water use, but not necessarily in reducing consumptive water use. Rationing outdoor
water use in cities has welfare implications [113]. However, pricing structures tend to
be more regressive than rationing because low-income households are more sensitive
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to price, and relatively high consumption households are less sensitive to price [110,
114]. Compared to other households, rich, big-lot households exhibit the least elastic
outdoor demand [113]. If the goal is to reduce outdoor consumptive use of water
rather than to maximize welfare, price might not be the best method.
Additional economic incentives include cash payments to replace turfgrass in
lawns or inefficient fixtures, washing machines, or toilets and rebates on ET and
smart water controllers [115]. In a 2008 study, installing low flow toilets reduced
consumption by 10% per toilet, low flow showerheads by 8% per fixture, and adoption
of water efficient irrigation technologies by 11% [116].
Noneconomic Strategies to Reduce Municipal Water Consumption
Command and control regulatory instruments reduce consumption [109]some-
times as much as 30% or more in water savings [116]. However, voluntary or mandated
reduction in water use is achievable for short-term droughts under a mentality of sac-
rifice for the greater good, but is often intolerable in the long-term [117]. In addition,
mandating water conserving technologies could result in a rebound effect of increased
water use due to knowledge about the water savings. Moreover, ordinances could also
result in public backlash if pushing against a cultural norm like outdoor water use or
tree regulation, care, and maintenance [113].
Other non-economic strategies include education and awareness campaigns
and behavior modification. Studies have looked at customized water billing or in-
cluding emoticons or patterns of water use in water bills [118–120]. For example,
messages providing social comparisons had a greater impact than social or technical
information alone, especially among high-consuming households [121]. However, as
with other voluntary conservation, this behavior change wanes over time [121]. Real-
time information about water consumptive and water rate via smart meters could
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help customers reach water-use targets [116].
2.4.3 Water Consumption via Municipal Water Losses
Municipal distribution system water losses could be considered an unproduc-
tive consumption of water. Water is lost through leaks and overflows in the distribu-
tion system and is estimated to be about 16% of total water supplied in a water sys-
tem [122]. About 75% of that water is generally estimated to be recoverable (meaning
a system will likely not be able to recover about 4% of its water losses) [122]. Accord-
ing to the Environmental Protection Agency, the United States will need to spend up
to $200 billion dollars to upgrade water transmission and distribution systems over
the next 20 years [123]. About 29% of this amount is estimated to be needed for
water loss control, specifically [122].
There are two types of water losses. Apparent water losses are those that occur
because of data handling or meter errors–water that is consumed but not properly
measured [124]. Real losses are the physical leaks and storage overflows. Real losses
are not consumed by customers but inflate production costs [124]. Economically
recoverable water losses are usually measured in water loss audits [125]. Audits
might involve inspection of billing records, monitoring flow, or detecting leaks through
acoustic, electromagnetic, thermal, or tracer methods [126]. Audits do not save water,
but the actions taken as a result of an audit could result in cost and water savings
[125]. Savings are usually seen in payment for identified apparent losses and avoided
cost associated with pumping, treating, and distributing identified real losses [125].
Those identified real losses could become a future supply.
Detecting and managing water leaks could result in substantial economic and
water savings. However, many states do not require water leak detection or collect
voluntary reports [127]. Twenty-three states have no water loss reporting. Sixteen
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states have rudimentary water loss reporting. Four states, including Texas, require
water loss reporting with American Water Works Association (AWWA) standard
terminology. For example, in 2003, Texas House Bill 3338 required that retail public
utilities file standardized water audits with the Texas Water Development Board
(TWDB) every five years [128]. Later in 2013, Texas House Bill 857 required utilities
with more than 3,300 connections to submit audits annually [128]. Six states and
Puerto Rico require use of audit software, validation of water loss data, or system-
specific, volume based performance benchmarking [124].
2.5 Water Consumption and Conservation for Unconventional
Oil and Gas
The United States has seen significant increases in oil and gas production due
to the use of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, technologies that made pro-
duction of unconventional zones economically possible [129]. Production from these
zones (shale and tight reservoirs) accounted for almost half of total U.S. production
in 2016 [131].
Hydraulic fracturing (HF) involves injecting large volumes of fluid, mostly wa-
ter, at high pressures to fracture shale and tight oil reservoirs to release the trapped
natural gas and petroleum. Horizontal drilling involves drilling a vertical well and
then, using a directional bit, turning that well until it runs the length of a desired
production zone. Shale deposits are thin, sometimes relatively impermeable, layers
of rock that contain significant quantities of natural gas or petroleum liquids and
often cover a wide area underground [171]. Horizontal wells are more suited to shale
exploration because of the increased exposure to the formation [132]. However, the
longer length of the wells and the need for large volumes of high-pressured water
make unconventional operations water-intensive. Moreover, drilling longer laterals
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(the horizontal portions of the well) has become more common and has increased the
needed volume of water [133]. In the Permian Basin, volume required for unconven-
tional wells increased by a factor of 10–16 per well and 7–10 if normalized by lateral
well length over a period of 2008 to 2015 [134]. However, the volume of water required
to extract unconventional oil and gas is dependent on many factors including geology,
local climate, water availability and management, and operator practices [135] and
varies even within single basins [136,137].
In addition to affecting supplies available for HF, semiarid and arid climates
are more prone to experience additional water stress from HF activities compared
to other climates [136, 137]. An assessment of the impact of water use for energy
development on groundwater availability showed declines in Texas aquifer levels due
to population growth and HF operations in the Barnett Shale [138].
2.5.1 Water Acquisition for Unconventional Oil and Gas Activities
Many companies source brackish water or fresh water from deep aquifers [139,
140]. Some blend these sources with treated produced water, as well [140]. The Texas
Oil and Gas Association reports that Anadarko Petroleum invested $550 million in
water management, conservation, recycling and water infrastructure projects [140].
For many other water-intensive sectors, the price of new water might be pro-
hibitive [171]. However, because of higher costs for other parts of the supply chain,
and because water is used to produce an even higher-value product, water prices are
unlikely to be a major hurdle for the oil and gas sector.
To illustrate, in 2012, Breitling Oil and Gas paid $68,000 (a mere 0.2% of the
$3.5 million spent to hydraulically fracture the well) to truck 3.4 million gallons of
water from Oklahoma to its operations [11]. In the Permian Basin, the cost to drill
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and complete a well might be up to $20 million with the cost of water purchase,
transportation, and disposal only amounting to less than 10% of that cost [141].
While a non-trivial expense, the majority of costs are not water-related, which means
the price of water is not the key financial determinant in the total cost of a well [171].
In 2014, the price of oil dropped precipitously due to changes in the global
market, pushing down the value for water as well as that for other oilfield service
industries. According to a report by Haynes & Boone, the drop in oil price caused
335 energy producers, oil field service companies, and pipeline operators in North
America to file for bankruptcy from 2015–2018 [142]. Texas companies filed more
than $74 billion in debt in that period, not including those that filed out of state [142].
With increases in the price of oil, it is expected that prices of services like provi-
sion of water rebound somewhat, as well [143]. Anadarko CEO Al Walker projected
that service costs would rise 10–15% in 2018 along with the rise in oil price [143].
Anadarko operates in the Delaware portion of the Permian. Water customers from
Select Energy in New Mexico, including Exxon Mobil, Conoco, and Chevron, paid
$0.02 per gallon of water ($0.85-1.00 per barrel) in 2018 [144].
Longer-term contracts for large supplies of water are not as affected by changes
in price of oil. Some companies have leveraged long-term contracts with wastewater
treatment systems for the continuous provision of water. Pioneer Natural Resources
has constructed a network of pipe to send a design flow of 6.3 million gallons of water
per day from Odessa’s Bob Derrington Water Reclamation Plant in Midland County,
Texas to one of its water management facilities [145]. The cost of upgrades for the
water plant is estimated to be $133.5 million [146]. The upgrades include additional
treatment for the reclaimed water to ensure it is suitable for HF operations [146].
Another operator, COG Operating LLC acquired a contract with Gulf Coast Waste
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Disposal Authority to receive wastewater at a rate of $2.75 per 1000 gallons in year
1 ($0.12 per barrel), $4.52 per 1000 gallons in year 2 ($0.19 per barrel), and $5 per
1000 gallons in year 3 ($0.21/barrel) and thereafter if the contract is renewed [147].
2.5.2 Wastewater Produced in Unconventional Oil and Gas Activities
There are multiple sources of wastewater in unconventional oil and gas op-
erations. The well drilling process requires lubricants, called drilling muds. Uncon-
ventional wells often have long laterals and might have more drilling muds in turn.
These drilling muds are a wastewater that needs to be managed. Compared to other
wastewater sources, drilling muds are not high volume.
After drilling, wells are completed. In unconventional operations, completion
usually involves HF with high volumes of frac fluids, including water, sand, and
chemicals. Some percentage of frac fluid returns to the surface after fracturing during
the short time after the well is completed [129]. The water that flows back to the
surface is often called flowback water. Flowback water will be similar in quality to
the frac fluid.
When the well enters the production phase, oil, gas, and other substances from
the production zone, including water, will flow to the surface. The water that occurs
naturally in the production zone is known as produced water and is extracted as a
by-product with the oil and gas over the life of the well. Produced water volumes can
average from 7–13 times the amount of produced crude oil in conventional wells [130,
134]. In conventional operations, produced water is often injected back into pressure-
depleted oil-producing reservoirs for enhanced oil recovery [134]. Unconventional wells
produce less water than conventional wells due to tighter reservoir formations [130].
Produced water quality varies across basins and, in unconventional operations, is
often highly saline. This produced water cannot be reinjected into the shale reservoirs
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for enhanced oil recovery and is often disposed into nonproducing geologic intervals
because it is the most affordable option [130, 134]. However, underground injection
of produced water is raising concerns about induced seismicity [148–150].
It is possible to recycle flowback and produced water for reuse in oil and gas
operations. However, supply and quality could be a hindrance. Volumes of flowback
and produced water (FP) vary over different basins. For example, in the Eagle Ford
Play, projected FP water volumes range from 20%-40% of that used for HF [131].
Alternatively, FP water in the Permian Basin in Texas exceeds the volume required
for HF operations. Reuse of produced water with minimal treatment could reduce
demand for fresh water for HF operations [134]. As of 2018, producers in the Permian
Basin in southeast New Mexico operated 27 water treatment and recycling plants
capable of treating 500 million gallons of water at a time [144].
2.6 Water Consumption and Conservation by Thermoelec-
tric Power Plants
Thermoelectric power plants combust fossil fuels or split atoms in a nuclear
reactor [151, 152]. Steam turbine power plants following the Rankine Cycle use that
heat to boil water into steam to move a turbine and generate electricity [151, 152].
The steam is then condensed and continues its path back through its cycle. The
most common cooling processes are open-loop or once-through cooling and closed-
loop or recirculating cooling [152]. Once-through cooling involves withdrawing large
quantities of water to condense steam and returning that water to the watershed at a
higher temperature [152]. Once-through cooling involves little consumption of water,
as almost all of the water withdrawn is returned to the source in the same form [152].
Recirculating cooling involves withdrawing smaller quantities of water to condense
steam and then recirculating that water through a heat sink–a pond or a cooling
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tower with a mechanical or natural draft to induce evaporation and cool the water to
a temperature that can then be reused [152]. Because the water is recirculated, less
water needs to be withdrawn [152]. Some of the water is consumed via evaporation
[152]. A larger amount of water is consumed for recirculating cooling than for once-
through cooling, but a smaller amount of water is withdrawn for recirculating cooling
than for once-through cooling [152].
Alternative cooling processes incorporate air cooling either in part or in total.
Dry cooling processes use air for all cooling of steam within the cycle [152]. Hybrid
cooling processes incorporate wet cooling and dry cooling and allow an operator to
switch between sources as needed. For example, when water is unavailable, dry cooling
could be employed [152]. Dry cooling is less efficient than traditional cooling with
water and thus involves an efficiency penalty [153–156]. The penalty is estimated
to be about 2% of energy that could be generated using wet cooling technology on
average [153–156]. Efficiency losses vary with air temperature, meaning dry cooled
power plants are less efficient during the summer at the same time that demands
might increase due to higher loads from air conditioning, compounding the effect
of the parasitic losses [157]. Thus, when water is available in a hybrid system, the
operator might choose to cool with water.
A study of power plants in Texas found that switching cooling technologies
from once-through to dry cooling could save up to 65–186 billion gallons of water
withdrawn per year–enough water for 1.3-3.6 million people annually.
2.7 Markets for Saved Water in Areas of Energy Extraction
States could take advantage of the high price of water used in unconventional
oil and gas activity by encouraging investment into water infrastructure. Many states
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already capitalize on oil and gas activity through severance tax revenues and taxes
that are reinvested in addressing the negative externalities from the extraction process
including clean-ups of air, land, and water pollution, as well as social problems [37].
As water shortages are expected to be a key environmental challenge of the next
century [38], water use could be added to the list of externalities to be addressed using
statewide tax and incentive programs. Doing so would be a means of economically
addressing current concerns while also preparing for the future.
Price-motivated water conservation is not a new topic. Municipal water users,
for example, might conserve to reduce their water bill. Irrigators have conserved with
the aim of leasing saved water to nearby water customers. In one past example, in
2007, the City of Roma in Starr County was awarded $2.8 million from the Econom-
ically Distressed Area Program to purchase water rights [158]. Rather than buying
more water from the markets, the city engineers decided to make a trade for water
rights with irrigation districts in Cameron County [158]. The city funded improve-
ments to irrigation canal conveyance efficiency within Irrigation District No. 2 and
received the excess water rights in return [158]. The City of Roma received the needed
water supply, while the irrigation districts still received the water they needed and
had about 26 million gallons (800 ac-ft or about 987,000 m3) of additional savings per
year. This example illustrates some of the potential for cross-sectoral water benefits
from efficiency investments made by the marginal user [171].
This work evaluates the potential for trades like this on a larger scale in three
water markets–existing surface water with two user types, emerging surface water
with many user types, and emerging groundwater with two user types. To assess the
feasibility of investments in water savings, this work conducts an analysis of the water
market in Texas and the impact of the water demand for hydraulic fracturing in that
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market.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
This work augments the existing literature through design of an integrated,
geographically-resolved hydrologic process to determine water conservation potential
through a combination of technical and market solutions. [171]. The research includes
four parts:
1. Develop an integrated model framework including market assessment, evalua-
tion of participants, and hydrologic characteristics,
2. Apply the model to an existing, active surface water market,
3. Apply the model to a possible emerging surface water market, and
4. Apply the model to an emerging groundwater market.
The methodology for each is explained in the following sections.
3.1 Designing the integrated, geographically-resolved hydro-
logic process to determine water conservation potential
The first step in this work is to develop the framework for the design of an in-
tegrated, geographically-resolved hydrologic process to determine water conservation
Some sections of this chapter were previously published in M. Cook and M. Webber, “Food,
Fracking, and Freshwater: The Potential for Markets and Cross-Sectoral Investments to Enable
Water Conservation,” Water, vol. 8, p. 45, 2016. The author of this dissertation contributed to the
previously published work by designing and performing research under the guidance of the co-author,
Michael Webber.
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potential. Previous analyses have built similar models to assess market transactions.
Wang et al. 2008 built an initial water rights allocation for subsequent water and net
benefits reallocation [159]. Vaux and Howitt 1984, Hurd et al. 2002, and Hurd et al.
2004 developed integrated basin-wide hydrologic models for policy analysis containing
an economic objective [160–162].
The model is divided into four steps. First, assess the basic policy landscape.
Second, identify past formal and informal water transactions, past participants, and
potential future participants in the market are assessed and integrated. Third, evalu-
ate the hydrologic conditions to estimate water allocations and the effect on supply for
users, as well as third parties. Fourth, assess costs and benefits of saving unproductive
consumptive water use for trade in a market.
3.2 Assessing the Policy Framework for a Water Market
3.2.1 Assessing the Water Market
For this integrated, geographically-resolved hydrologic process, the first step
is to identify policy governing water rights to determine whether market efficiency
is possible. An efficient market requires open information–like pricing and available
water–as well as clearly identified property rights. Clearly outlined property rights
are water rights that establish a volume and location and allow the user to sell or
lease the right and are able to participate in a market.
Some water rights have stipulations that limit trading between sectors. For
example, municipal water rights might need a firm allocation rather than an inter-
ruptible one. This rule limits trade from irrigation to municipal water use to only the
firm part of the irrigator’s allocation.
Some water rights do not establish an allocation volume, limiting total water
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withdrawals to available water supplies, a desired future condition for storage for the
system, or reasonable use for each user. In these cases, property rights might exist–
for example, a landowner owning access to water under their land–but the rights are
not clearly outlined. Trade in a market without limits on withdrawal could lead to
exploitation of resources. Conversely, water right regulations could protect private
rights and promote economic activity between water rights holders.
Assessing the Water Market in Texas
The analysis in this work focus on regional transactions in Texas. Thus, it is
helpful to outline the market framework at the state level. The subsequent analyses
chapters will focus on the specific regional markets.
In Texas, formal water markets have been slow to develop. Water is rarely
traded across Texas due to the large size of the state and the lack of natural or
man-made conduits for large water transfers like those in California [163]. Where
water is traded, local markets prevail, specifically in the Lower Rio Grande Valley
(in the Southern tip of Texas), over the Edwards Aquifer (in central Texas), and in
the Texas Panhandle. Other markets exist through local water trusts [171]. Despite
the drawbacks to the current water trading system, water transfers have occurred in
Texas for decades [171].
Usual transactions occur within the agriculture sector or from agriculture to
non-agriculture users [163]. According to the Western Governors Association, Texas
traded a total 925 billion gallons between 1988 and 2009 at an average 2.6 million
gallons per transfer [164]. Trades increased between 2007 and 2009 resulting in 49
million gallons of transfers over those three years [164]. However, the ongoing drought
in Texas triggered and increases in demand from various water use sectors, including
oil and gas, has increased demand for water transfers across the state. During the
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drought in 2011, users sold or leased more than 555 billion gallons [164].
To assess the water market in Texas, various public and private datasets in-
cluding hard data from governmental entities and soft data such as interviews with
water marketers, local or state agencies, and landowners were curated and integrated.
Existing market literature, as well as press releases for water sales across the state
were also examined. Water transactions between 1987 and 2008 were compared to
those between 2009 and 2014 [171]. The two time periods show the increase in value
attributed to water with the increase in oil and gas production after 2009 due to
the increase in unconventional oil and gas production. However, as the price of oil
fluctuates, the value of water used to extract that oil (and natural gas) will fluctuate,
as well. After the decrease in oil price in 2014, the value of water used for oil and gas
production also decreased. This work does not capture that decrease in water value,
but as the price of oil dropped by more than half of its market value, the price of
water is assumed to have reduced by about 50%, as well. This analysis shows a range
of mining sector prices, capturing the highs of 2014 with acknowledgement that those
prices are most relevant in a high oil price environment and the lows captured within
the market transactions are more relevant for a low oil price environment.
As the number of mining transactions has increased, so has the price of water
per cubic meter. Between 1987 and 2008, prior to the increase in hydraulic fracturing
in much of Texas, the median lease price for mining water was approximately $0.11 per
thousand gallons (kgal) and the average price was approximately $0.38 per kgal [171].
Between 2009 and 2014, the median lease price was approximately $14.80 per kgal
and the average price was $15.10 per kgal [171]. Figure 3.1 shows the average prices
per county reported between 1987 and 2014. This period includes drought in the
1990s and early 2000s, as well as the most extreme one-year drought on record in
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2011. The change in mining water price between the two periods analyzed reflects
the effect of spot pricing and could also be due to the spike in water demand for oil
and gas drilling as well as the decrease in water supplies caused by the intense, state-
wide drought that began in 2011, among other factors. However, the data show high
water prices for oil and gas activity in 2013 and 2014 (after the end of the one-year
drought), presumably due to the high value associated with the use of that water.
In examining Texas’ water market, it is important to keep transaction costs in
mind as they might create a significant barrier to market allocation of water resources
and might cause implementation to lag [165]. Transaction costs are the resources used
to define, establish, maintain, and transfer property rights [166]. These costs might
include administrative costs or costs of exchanging ownership titles [166]. They are
incurred by a subset of the actors [165]. Transaction costs vary across the state of
Texas. Policies vary at the state level between groundwater and surface water man-
agement and availability and at the regional level between groundwater conservation
districts, river basin authorities, and other districts. Previous research on transac-
tion costs estimates ranges from 8–34% [166–170]. Transaction costs associated with
administrative fees account for approximately 21% of total water costs in the Rio
Grande Valley [171].
3.2.2 Determining Potential Market Participants
Potential market participants are chosen from water users in the basin–both
long-established and new users. Current and future annual water supplies, demands,
needs, and locations were evaluated. Water users with needs could provide stimulus
to a market as demand points willing to pay for water. Water users with existing
fulfilled demands could provide supply points to the market, saving water and leasing
to others, depending on their conservation potential.
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Figure 3.1: Water transactions across the state of Texas often occur in local markets in
the Lower Rio Grande Valley below Falcon Dam, in the Edwards Aquifer area, and in
Northwest Texas. Between 2009 and 2014, transactions increased in South and West
Texas and in the Panhandle due to the increase water demand for hydraulic fracturing.
Data were compiled from various sources including private operators and [1–20].
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Water users with existing demands must then be evaluated for their water use
efficiency. For example, agriculture water users would be evaluated for their water
application efficiency. Municipal water users would be evaluated for their water use
per capita and water losses per system total. Thermoelectric water users would be
evaluated by their water withdrawal and consumption per unit of electricity generated.
After evaluating water use efficiency, water management plans must be eval-
uated for users deemed to have low water use efficiency. In evaluating water man-
agement, ”low hanging fruit” options for reducing water demand would be identified
and users would be included in the market for conservation.
This work focuses on conserving unproductive consumption. A discussion of
unproductive consumption is included in Chapter 2. In areas where downstream
and future generations depend on the unconsumed portion of diversions, including
return flows and aquifer storage, investment in conservation could lead to water de-
pletion [69]. Focus on conserving consumptive water use avoids these unintended con-
sequences. Unproductive consumptive water uses include transpiration from weeds,
evaporation from soils and irrigation canals, and evaporation from poorly designed
irrigation systems [68]. Reducing unproductive consumptive losses through conser-
vation and efficiency would make surplus water available to be used by the existing
user or reallocated to other users [68].
3.2.3 Hydrologic Models
It is important that negotiations for water trading include a baseline for water
availability. Because a contract would be based on money paid for an amount of
water provided, the negotiating point for both parties should be based on a drought
year to set a conservative allocation. A farmer interested in selling water and still
producing crops would want to ensure they will have enough water to do so after a
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trade as would the operator interested in fracturing wells with the saved water.
Existing water demands and hydrologic conditions must be evaluated to deter-
mine effects of water trading on water supplies, current water users, and new users.
It is sometimes possible to use an existing model that is already calibrated to the hy-
drologic conditions of the basin as well as the demands and discharges of water users.
Such a model might be employed within the basin for planning purposes, research,
or both. The availability of a model of this caliber is the best case scenario but not
always the case in practice.
Instead, it might be necessary to develop an allocation model if one is not
available. Three allocation models are included in this section as they are used in
the integrated process for each case study. Each model was developed and calibrated
to its region. In developing an allocation model, it is important to choose a format
that incorporates the necessary water supply, demand, and policy inputs over a time
period sufficient for decision-making.
Because of differences in water allocation policies and hydrologic conditions
across the state of Texas, three different computer-based models are used to simu-
late water resources and demand sites: Water Evaluation and Planning (WEAP),
Groundwater Availability Models (GAMs), and Water Availability Models (WAMs)
coupled with the Water Rights Analysis Package (WRAP). Each incorporates a set
of climatic conditions, naturalized flows, and demand sites, and policies to determine
current water availability. WEAP and WAMs also incorporate an allocative system
to represent the priority systems that govern water rights in each basin. WEAP is
also able to incorporate interstate compacts and international treaties in its allocation
system.
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3.2.3.1 Water Evaluation and Planning
Water Evaluation and Planning (WEAP) is a simulation environment that
accounts for prioritized water demand sites linked to water supplies from rivers, reser-
voirs, and aquifers [172]. The model platform is able to simulate environmental and
human parameters, including naturalized flows and demand sites such as municipal,
industrial, and irrigation withdrawals. It can also incorporate policy settings such as
water treaties and priorities. WEAP is able to be calibrated by adjusting parameters
to achieve results closer to the historical conditions. All of these capabilities make
WEAP an ideal choice to simulate water withdrawals and consumption in the Rio
Grande/Bravo basin.
3.2.3.2 Water Availability Models
Water Availability Models simulate the amount of water that would be in a
river or stream under certain conditions. The WAMs consist of a modeling program,
the Water Rights Analysis Package, and the WAM text input files of basin-specific
information [173]. The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) uses
WAMs to evaluate existing water rights and allocate new withdrawals or amend
existing ones [173]. WAM and WRAP together simulate current water rights holders
in a river basin using demand sites, naturalized streamflow, historical precipitation
and evaporation, and corresponding reservoir operations over a period between 1934
and 1998, capturing the 1950-1957 Texas drought of record (but not the most 1-year
intense drought of 2011). If water is available, the models estimate how often the
water would be available [174].
One WAM is of interest to our analysis, the full execution model. The full
execution model simulates perpetual water rights holders withdrawing their entire
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permitted volume with no return flow to the river basin [173]. The full execution is
a worst-case scenario for water use as usually most water users return some of their
allocation to the river. It is used by TCEQ to evaluate availability for new perpetual
water rights and amendments [173]. TCEQ issues a permit when 75% of the proposed
water diversion is available 75% of the time except in cases of municipal water use
in which permits are issued when 100% of the proposed water diversion is available
100% of the time [175]. Allocation rules are relaxed when backup water rights are
secured, though.
The Water Rights Analysis Package (WRAP) simulates the text file of WAM
data of permitted water rights for full execution and current conditions with natural-
ized streamflow and observed meteorological condition over a historical time period
in a computer-based model [174]. WRAP is a set of Fortran-based programs used
to model diversions based on priority and location over daily and monthly time-
steps [174]. Together, the text WAM and the WRAP simulation reveal the actual
amount of water diversions available to current water rights holders based on observed
historical climate conditions. With this model, it is possible to evaluate changes in
water use by current users, effects of additional users on the basin, and potential
effects of historical drought on current water users.
3.2.3.3 Location-Allocation of Groundwater
Groundwater Conservation Districts
Groundwater Conservation Districts (GCDs) are regional authorities tasked
with managing groundwater supplies for their district [176]. As of 2017, 99 GCDs
operate in Texas, 61 of which are single-county districts. Parts of the state are not
governed by a GCD, though; only 174 of the 254 counties in Texas are included
either fully or partially in a GCD. GCDs can set well spacing and water production
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requirements and are required by statute, passed in House Bill 1763 in 2005, to permit
only to their managed available groundwater [176,177].
Groundwater Availability Models
A groundwater availability model (GAM) is a tool that can be used to assess
managed available groundwater based on hydrologic and human inputs like hydraulic
head, recharge, and well pumpage [178]. The GAM is a numerical groundwater
flow model and mathematical representation of the physical characteristics of an
aquifer [178]. The model calculates hydraulic head at discrete locations within a grid
and is calibrated to measured hydraulic heads [178]. The GAM uses MODFLOW-
2000 due to its public domain and wide-spread use in groundwater models [178]. The
GAM is limited by data availability and should only be used on a regional scale due
to the grid size [178].
Desired Future Conditions
Groundwater Management Areas are larger areas that cover all of the major
and minor aquifers of the state. Each encompasses multiple GCDs as well as areas
without a GCD. GCDs determine their Desired Future Conditions, the physical con-
ditions of the aquifer that the GCD intends to meet in the future. DFCs have to be
physically possible and compatible with other DFCs in the Groundwater Management
Area [177]. GCDs in the same groundwater management area meet to determine the
Modeled Available Groundwater of the aquifer based on DFCs and the results of
GAMs [177]. The State does not directly decide how much groundwater is available;
GCDs decide in the DFC and GMA processes [177]. In developing their groundwater
management plans, GCDs must use GAMs if they are available.
Modeled Available Groundwater
While the GAMs show a physical representation of water available, the DFCs
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represent the political water available and sometimes allow for over-exploitation of
the aquifer in the short term. This work uses the modeled available groundwater
(MAG) determined from the GAM and DFC process to assess impact on groundwater
resources.
Location-Allocation
Groundwater is not allocated by any policy in Texas. Fresh groundwater,
along with other alternative water sources, is often reallocated from its source based
on price, though. To simulate price-induced reallocation of varied water sources in
West Texas, a model of water supplies and demands is constructed within ArcGIS
using the location-allocation network analysis.
Location-allocation is a solver used for facility location that chooses facilities
to satisfy demand and minimize weighted distances [179]. Because of the large num-
ber of potential solutions, ArcGIS location-allocation uses heuristic solution methods
(partial search algorithms) reported in Densham and Rushton 1992 [180] to reduce
the amount of solutions evaluated to find the optimal solution. The solver generates
an origin-destination matrix of shortest path costs and then constructs an edited ver-
sion of this matrix through Hillsman editing [179, 181]. The solver uses this edited
matrix to generate a set of semi-randomized solutions and refines those solutions by
applying a Teitz and Bart vertex substitution heuristic [179, 182]. Teitz and Bart
(1968) vertex substitution heuristic is useful because it frequently converges to the
optimum solution, irrespective of problem size, and it usually converges on a solu-
tion after a small number of iterations [180]. Hillsman editing reduces the original
problem size and thus reduces the number of iterations required [180]. The location-
allocation method then uses a higher-level heuristic (metaheuristic) to create better
solutions [179]. The location-analysis returns the final solution when no improvement
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Table 3.1: The hydrologic models have specific assets and existing uses.
Model Policy Inputs Physical Inputs
Water Evaluation and
Planning (WEAP)
• Treaties,
• Priorities, and
• Allocations
• Naturalized flows,
• Groundwater/surface water
interaction, and
• Water uses
Water Availability Model (WAM)
and
Water Rights Analysis
Package (WRAP)
• Prior appropriation • Naturalized flows (including
groundwater return flow to
stream) and
• Water uses
Location-Allocation • Price-based
allocation
• Supplies and demands and
• Physical network of choice
is possible [179]. This set of tools does not necessarily develop an optimal result but
develops near-optimal results. A summary of the hydrologic models mentioned in
this section is included in Table 3.1.
Results presented in this analysis do not include uncertainty. However, it is
important to acknowledge that there is error inherent in estimating water allocations
through each of the models applied within the integrated process in this dissertation.
Each model carries its own technical errors associated with approximating flows, wa-
ter allocations, and discharges. The near optimization of the location-allocation, for
example, generates an unrealistic approximation of actual activities. The inherent
imperfection of model results underscores the need to ensure high quality data, ap-
propriate model choice, and a long period of study in an effort to reduce the error
incorporated in the results. In addition to technical errors, each of the water models is
attempting to approximate human activity. A good water model could highlight areas
43
of human error and opportunities for improvement in system allocation activities.
3.2.4 Cost Comparison Metrics for Water Demand Reduction Methods
Assessing Volume and Cost of Water Demand Reductions
Irrigators are one candidate for water savings and leases. In this study, the
ranges in potential water savings available are measured per area covered, σw[gallons/acre−
yr], for irrigation water-saving best management practices (BMPs) [171].
The water savings, Vws, in gallons/yr possible from implementation of a water-
efficient practice is calculated using Equation 3.1 where Airr represents the amount
of irrigated land in acre [171].
Vws = σw × Airr (3.1)
The estimated total cost, C, in one year of the implementation of one of
these irrigation efficiency practices over a stretch of irrigated land is calculated using
Equation 3.2, where Airr represents the amount of irrigated land in each county in
acre and Carea represents the cost per area [171].
C = Carea × Airr = Carea × V ws
σw
(3.2)
The estimated cost per volume [gallons/yr] of water savings, Cvol, is then
determined using Equation 3.3 [171].
Cvol =
Carea
σw
(3.3)
The equations are used to estimate the total water savings that could be
made available, the total cost, and the cost per volume of water saved through use of
irrigation BMPs. The cost is then compared to the market price for water used for
hydraulic fracturing.
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Because systems have different lengths of effect, before comparing costs be-
tween systems, we assess the net present value, NPV , and recurring yearly payment,
Rt, of each system so comparisons can be made on equivalent values. If the cost of the
system is given as a recurring yearly payment, the net present value is estimated from
the recurring payment, Rt, over a period, t, using a discount rate, i. The discount rate
is the rate that could be earned on an investment and is assumed to be the market
interest rate for agricultural loans as reported by TWDB, 3.15% [22]. However, many
conservation projects are financed privately under different interest rates. Examples
of the cost of irrigation and municipal conservation varied by common payment peri-
ods and interest rates reported by TWDB are shown in Figure 3.2 and in Appendix
A.
NPV =
N∑
t=0
Rt
(1 + i)t
(3.4)
Conversely, the recurring yearly payment, Rt can be calculated from the net
present value as
Rt =
NPV × (i× (1 + i)n)
(1 + i)n − 1 (3.5)
where n is the number of recurring yearly payments.
Irrigation water demand reductions are an integral part of a water conserva-
tion and efficiency market. However, it is also relevant to explore water reductions in
municipal, industrial, and thermoelectric power water use as those sectors also repre-
sent significant water demands. For each type of water demand reduction, total cost,
volume estimated to be saved, and the cost per volume are determined. To deter-
mine best practices for conservation in these sectors, relevant literature and publicly
available data from TWDB, TCEQ, the Energy Information Administration (EIA),
municipalities, and the literature is evaluated. It is important to choose methods
that negligibly reduce productivity or for which costs incurred due to loss in produc-
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Figure 3.2: The capital cost of irrigation conservation reported by TWDB [21] is
shown using interest rates and loan lengths (years, signified with a Y) offered by
TWDB or the market and reported by TWDB [22].
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tivity can be offset by water trade. Low cost, high yield options are identified when
available as these “low hanging fruit” will be most feasible to implement. High cost,
high yield or low cost, low yield options might be possible, as well if market prices for
water allow. High cost, low yield options are likely poor choices for implementation.
For each conservation scenario, the cost to conserve water is determined as
outlined above and compared to the cost of water as determined in Section 3.2.4.
The baseline value to the water user is the total profit of selling surplus water each
year. Profit of increased conservation, efficiency, or management is then estimated.
The net profit of water lease, pi, is calculated as the benefit of leasing water
(price of water, p, multiplied by the volume of water sold, V ) less the cost of water
savings (cost per volume of water saved Cvol multiplied by the volume of water con-
served, Vws). It is not assumed that the total amount of water saved would reach the
oil and gas operator in every period.
pi = benefits− costs (3.6)
In a water lease scenario, the net profit of water lease is for the lease of water
less the cost to save that water:
pi = (p× V )− (Cvol × Vws) (3.7)
In the baseline scenario where no water savings occurs, Vws = 0, but there is
a cost associated with not irrigating farmland or otherwise beneficially using water
Cval. The net profit of water lease is for the lease of water less the value of water used
for another purpose and Equation 3.7 reduces to:
pi = (p× V )− (Cval × Vws) (3.8)
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Implementation costs are minor compared to the current purchasing price for
water in the mining sector in Texas, indicating the potential for partnerships in which
the energy sector pays for the water demand reduction measures in other sectors and
receives the water made available in return.
3.2.5 Reliability, Resilience, and Vulnerability
As water demand changes for certain users in the hydrologic models, it is
relevant to assess what the changes in demand mean for water supplied to that user
and to other relevant users in the basin. To do that, we use performance criteria:
the deficit, reliability, resiliency, and vulnerability of water supplied to target users
in each study area.
Deficit
Water demand is not always fulfilled with water supplied. The value of unmet
demand at time, t, for the ith water user is termed the deficit, Dit, as shown in
Equation 3.9. {
Dit = (X
i
Target,tX
i
Supplied,t, if X
i
Target,t > X
i
Supplied,t
0, if X iTarget,t = X
i
Supplied,t
(3.9)
If the water supplied to the ith water user, X iSupplied,t, is less than that de-
manded by the user, X iTarget,t, the deficit is X
i
Target,tX
i
Supplied,t. If the water supplied
to the ith water user is equal to or exceeds the demand of that water user, the deficit
is 0.
Reliability
Water demand reliability is the probability that the water supplied to each
user meets its water demand during the period of study [183].
Reli =
No. of times Dit = 0
n
(3.10)
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Time-based reliability, shown in Equation 3.10 as Reli, is the portion of time
that each user is supplied the water it demands or the number of times there is a
nonzero deficit, Di 6= 0, over the total number of time intervals considered (n months
or years) [184].
Resilience
The system’s resilience is its ability to recover from a period of failure or
an unsatisfactory condition and must be considered to assess the effect of varied
hydrologic conditions on water supplied under altered demand conditions.
Resi =
No. of times Dit = 0 follows D
i
t > 0
No. of times Dit > 0 occurred
(3.11)
Mathematically, resilience, shown in Equation 3.11 as Reli, is the probability
that a satisfactory value will follow an unsatisfactory value [185] or the number of
times Dit 6= 0, follows Dit > 0 for all times Dit > 0 occurred [184].
Vulnerability
Vulnerability is the probable value of the water deficits [183] and can be consid-
ered as the severity of failures [184]. Here, vulnerability is considered to be the average
failure or expected value of the water deficits as used by Loucks et al. 2005 [186] and
shown mathematically in Equation 3.12.
V uli =
∑t=n
t=0 D
i
t
No. of times Dit>0occurred
Water demandi
(3.12)
In the annual average failure is the sum of the deficits,
∑t=n
t=0 D
i
t, divided by the
amount of times a deficit occurred for the ith water user. Dimensionless vulnerability
is calculated by dividing the annual average failure by the annual average water
demand for the ith water user.
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3.2.6 Flowchart of Model Methodology
The research methodology outlined in this section is represented graphically in
Figure 3.3. Dotted lines represent exit points–property rights are not clearly defined,
water use efficiency is already adequate and thus savings for lease are not feasible, or
low hanging fruit are not available and cost might be prohibitive. In the first case, the
policy framework does not encourage market activity. A policy change would need
to occur to make market conditions available. In the latter two dotted line cases,
it might be possible to re-iterate and find other water users to participate in the
market. The framework ends with determinations of profit and water supply metrics
of reliability, resilience, and vulnerability. If each improves compared to baseline, the
market would yield benefits for all water users involved.
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Figure 3.3: The research methodology outlined in Section 3.1 is represented graphi-
cally in this figure.
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Chapter 4
Objective 2: Existing Active Surface Water
Market
4.1 Apply the Model to an Active Surface Water Market
To assess the potential of saving water through trade, the integrated, geographically-
resolved allocation model is applied to an existent surface water market in the Rio
Grande Basin in South Texas. The entire basin is shown in Figure 4.1. This analysis
focuses on the portion of the basin at the border of Texas and Mexico, nearing the
Gulf of Mexico.
Trade is evaluated between two types of water users only: oil and gas operators
and irrigators. In this basin, municipalities are growing rapidly and often buy or
lease water rights from irrigators. Since they compete with oil and gas operations
for surplus water resources, they are not considered as a source for surplus from
conservation at this time. In the future, however, municipalities could be a source for
conserved water for their own use or for other buyers within the basin.
Water reductions associated with market activity are compared to baseline
water supplies. With the surge in oil and gas drilling in the nearby Eagle Ford Shale,
energy companies have been buying or leasing water rights on the Rio Grande in
Some sections of this chapter were previously published in M. Cook and M. Webber, “Food,
Fracking, and Freshwater: The Potential for Markets and Cross-Sectoral Investments to Enable
Water Conservation,” Water, vol. 8, p. 45, 2016. The author of this dissertation contributed to the
previously published work by designing and performing research under the guidance of the co-author,
Michael Webber.
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Figure 4.1: The Lower Rio Grande in South Texas is the focus of this analysis. The
entire watershed stretches across four states in the United States of America and five
states in the United Mexican States.
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South Texas [164]. One of the major irrigation districts in the Lower Rio Grande,
Hidalgo County Irrigation District No. 2, has added diversion points in the Middle
Rio Grande where water can be easily delivered to energy entities [164]. Landowners
in other parts of the shale basin have sold water from their wells to oil and gas
producers. Landowners might sell their water through water marketing firms [164].
One firm reportedly sold more than 58 million gallons to oil and gas companies [14].
With active trading in the area for both irrigation water rights and supply for
oil and gas, the Rio Grande Basin makes a good testbed for analysis of the potential
for conservation water trading through application of the integrated, geographically-
resolved allocation model.
4.2 Market Framework and Participants
4.2.1 Rights in the Rio Grande
The first step in application of the integrated, geographically-resolved alloca-
tion model is outlining the relevant policy framework. Water rights in the Lower
Rio Grande, below the Falcon-Amistad reservoir, differ from those on other rivers in
that they are allocated on an account basis in which the watermaster, the arbitrator
of water rights in this basin, records withdrawals and subtracts use from allocated
accounts [46]. Rights for municipal uses are set at one priority level in which alloca-
tions renew on a yearly basis while irrigation rights are set at another level in which
balances carry forward into the next year [46]. Thus, irrigation accounts are more
constrained than municipal accounts [46]. Surplus in the Falcon-Amistad reservoir
for any given month is allocated to the irrigation users [46]. As water rights of certain
types are on the same priority and allocations are recorded and essentially banked by
the watermaster, the policy framework is favorable to market transactions.
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4.2.2 Market Participants
Irrigators
The second step in application of the integrated, geographically-resolved allo-
cation model is identifying market participants. As a major agricultural producer for
Texas and the United States as a whole, irrigators in the Lower Rio Grande Valley
region consume a large amount of water –about 79% of total regional water use [23].
The counties with the highest irrigation water withdrawals in the valley, Cameron
and Hidalgo Counties, consume about 114–195 billion gallons (432–740 million m3
or 350,000–600,000 ac-ft) of water per year, respectively. The Lower Rio Grande
Valley could be a prime candidate for large-scale irrigation efficiency improvements.
Some Best Management Practices (BMPs) have already been implemented in irriga-
tion districts in the valley [73]. However, many BMPs, including brush management,
crop residue management and conservation tillage, and tailwater recovery and reuse
systems are not in wide-spread use [73].
Furrow dikes (small dams for each ridge between a planted row of crops); gated
and flexible pipe to prevent seepage in irrigation channels and furrows; recovery of
irrigation runoff water (tailwater recovery); and brush management are potential
methods of demand reduction for irrigators in the Lower Rio Grande Basin. Past
studies have shown the furrow dike system, for example, is a cost-effective manage-
ment practice for producers in the Southeastern U.S. that positively impacts natu-
ral resource conservation, producer profit margins, and environmental quality [100].
Costs of water savings via BMPs are calculated as mentioned in Section 3.2.4.
Oil and Gas Operators
The Eagle Ford Shale resides beneath Webb and Dimmit Counties in the Rio
Grande Basin. Counties in the Lower Rio Grande Valley could benefit from future
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Figure 4.2: This model of market transactions seeks to supply users paying high prices
for water: oil and gas operations in the Lower Rio Grande.
economic growth of the oil and gas industry; either due to increased oil and gas
production or water sales. The target area of water reallocation to hydraulically
fractured wells is shown in Figure 4.2.
Use of recycled municipal eﬄuent or flowback and produced water (FP) is
possible, but the supplies are relatively low compared to the demands of hydraulic
fracturing. In a lifecycle analysis, Ikonnikova et al. 2017 [131] found that FP water
supplies are about 40–60% of hydraulic fracturing demands. It is possible to treat
and reuse this water, but demands will also require the use of fresh or brackish water
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resources. Thus, this analysis focuses on reducing consumed fresh water as a source
for supply.
4.3 Hydrologic Model: WEAP
The next step in application of the integrated, geographically-resolved alloca-
tion model is to simulate the allocations of the market participants within the policy
environment. Water supplies and uses were simulated using Water and Evaluation
and Planning (WEAP), a tool that is able to simulate water supplies and demands
over time, incorporating policy dynamics. All of these capabilities make WEAP a
useful hydrologic model for the Rio Grande/ Bravo basin.
The water supplies for the Rio Grande/Bravo river basin were simulated us-
ing hydrologic data obtained by Teasley 2009 [172] and Sandoval et al. 2011 [187]
through a joint effort between the Center for Research in Water Resources, the Texas
Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), Conagua, and the Mexican Insti-
tute of Water Technology [172]. The model simulates a 60-year period (October
1940–September 2000) of data that includes the drought of record for the State of
Texas, as well as other times of high and low flow. The model includes naturalized
flows for the Rio Grande/Bravo and its major tributaries, as well as losses due to
evaporation, evapotranspiration, and seepage.
WEAP is also able to incorporate municipal, irrigation, and other demand
sites. The WEAP model for the Rio Grande/Bravo simulates water deliveries based on
the account of water in the two major reservoirs in the basin, Amistad and Falcon, and
the priority of the water rights attached to demand sites. Municipal and agriculture
water demands are allocated by a watermaster at different priorities– municipal, then
agriculture rights at the A priority, followed by agriculture rights at the B priority.
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Due to the large number of demand sites in the Rio Grande/Bravo basin, demands
are aggregated by use type, priority, and region. Users in Texas are divided by section
in the watermaster jurisdiction (watermaster section).
WEAP allows integration of policy settings such as water treaties. The Rio
Grande/Bravo basin is subject to the 1906 Convention, the United States-Mexico
Treaty of 1944, Interstate Compacts for the Rio Grande between New Mexico, Col-
orado, and Texas, and Texas Watermaster rules. The WEAP model of the Rio
Grande/Bravo basin was calibrated to historical conditions in previous work by
Teasley 2009 [172] and Sandoval et al. 2011 [187]. The model is then validated
by entering historical demands for a 15-year period to determine if the simulation
matched historical operations.
Water demand reductions are modeled as percent reductions in demand at
certain irrigation watermaster sections of 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15%. Water leases to
oil and gas are modeled as additional nodes that demand water at an amount equal
to the reduction at the irrigation watermaster site. The full execution of the WEAP
model of the Rio Grande/Bravo is for 1940-2000 using climatic conditions of that
period, reduction in demand due to best management practices of 1%, 5%, 10%, and
15%, and subsequent lease to an oil and gas operator. The total amount of water
supplied to oil and gas over that period is then summed to estimate the amount of
water that could be leased to oil and gas over the 60-year period with an investment
in irrigation management.
Reducing Impacts on Third Parties
Reductions in irrigation water use associated with water conservation could
result in reduced return flows to the Rio Grande/Bravo or reduced infiltration to
aquifers beneath agricultural activity. To limit impacts on aquifer recharge, water-
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master sections residing above aquifer recharge zones were not considered for this
analysis. While they could still participate in a market, the impact to future ground-
water resources–including both the impact of reduced irrigation and the impact of
increased groundwater use for hydraulic fracturing as the alternative to surface water–
should be considered before reducing irrigation for other purposes.
The watermaster sections assessed for the reductions are sections 5, 5A, 5B,
6A, and 6B which reside between Falcon and Amistad Reservoirs and sections 6AL,
6BL, 7A, 7B, 13A, and 13B, below Falcon Reservoir, as shown in Figure 4.3. Water-
master sections 8–12 reside above the recharge zones of local aquifers. Conservation
in the latter sections was not simulated to avoid effects on aquifer recharge in the
near-term. Watermaster sections 1–4 are upstream of oil and gas activity. Transport-
ing water from these watermaster sections would incur increased transmission losses
and potential third-party effects as water from upstream users passes by downstream
users to get to the new oil and gas water users. They were also not included in
the analysis. All watermaster sections could participate in a market. However, the
recharge and third-party effects should be acknowledged in future water allocations.
4.4 Assessing Potential Costs and Benefits
4.4.1 Water Deliveries
Water demands and deliveries are simulated for all users in the Rio Grande/Bravo
Basin and water reductions for water leases to oil and gas only at watermaster sec-
tions collocated or downstream of the Eagle Ford Shale for each watermaster section
of interest. The water that could be made available to oil and gas operators from
each watermaster section after 1%, 5%, 10%, or 15% water conservation is shown in
Figure 4.4. If operators were interested in reducing effort by seeking out one area to
conserve water (rather than all districts analyzed), the results suggest working with
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Figure 4.3: The watermaster sections assessed for the reductions are sections 5, 5A,
5B, 6A, and 6B which reside between Falcon and Amistad Reservoirs and sections
6AL, 6BL, 7A, 7B, 13A, and 13B, below Falcon Reservoir.
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Figure 4.4: Water that could be saved by irrigation districts and made available to oil
and gas operators is shown by watermaster section. Watermaster sections are shown
from upstream to downstream in a left-to-right order.
the 13A district of irrigators would yield the most water.
The potential water savings opens up the opportunity for a water market
in the Lower Rio Grande Valley. Wells fractured in Webb and Dimmit Counties
consumed about 3 billion gallons of water in 2016 and 2017 [24]. The 900 million
gallons of water saved by all watermaster sections conserving 15% of their water use
could provide about 30% of the water needed in those counties, offsetting an increase
in water consumption of the same amount.
4.4.2 Reliability, Resilience, and Vulnerability
For each scenario, including baseline and water reductions of 1%, 5%, 10%,
and 15%, the water demands and deliveries are calculated in the WEAP model. From
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Figure 4.5: Reliability for irrigators following trades of varying amounts of saved
water, shown by watermaster group saving water. Reliability for all irrigation sections
is shown to increase from baseline in all scenarios of conservation and trade.
the demand and delivery calculations, deficit, reliability, resilience, and vulnerability
of water supply is estimated for the water users of interest. Baseline and conservation
scenarios are compared to determine whether users benefit from water reductions
and leases in terms of improving their supply. As shown in Figure 4.5, reliability of
water supplied to irrigators involved in water trades increases from the baseline in
all scenarios. Since reliability is the frequency of meeting demand over the analysis
period, the irrigators benefit from an increase in reliability. It is important to analyze
the effect of allocations on performance parameters such as reliability, in addition
to the desired parameter, volume of water supplied, to ensure changes do not have
unintentional negative impacts on expected supply.
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4.4.3 Costs and Benefits of Water Sales
Cost to Conserve Water
Figure 4.6 shows the estimated cost of BMP implementation per cubic me-
ter of potential water savings upon installation. These implementation costs are
minor compared to the current purchasing price for water in the mining sector in
Texas, indicating the potential for an energy-agriculture partnership in which the
energy sector pays for the improved irrigation efficiency measures and receives the
water made available in return. Given that buying water in water markets is more
cost effective than other policies intended to encourage improved irrigation efficiency
through subsidies, there is potential for irrigation efficiency improvements through
market mechanisms [83].
By incorporating irrigation BMPs, irrigation districts would likely be able to
save water, maintain their crops, and profit from the sale. Simultaneously, shale oil
and gas companies would have access to freshwater for hydraulic fracturing while
reducing their risk of exposure to municipal restrictions and water shortages. The
increase in water availability could also make more water available for ecosystems.
Thus, this makeshift water market could solve water needs for multiple sectors.
While oil and gas operators can pay for water now, that purchase often offsets
other water uses, for example, reducing the amount of irrigated agriculture activity
or increasing stress on water supplies. A water market promoting irrigation efficiency
measures might encourage better resource allocation and increase the amount of water
available for economic activity (e.g. hydraulic fracturing as analyzed in this paper)
and/or ecosystems as Texas considers instream flow requirements into its bays and
estuaries.
The market already exists. However, there is a potential for the market to
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Figure 4.6: The price of water varies per BMP, but all water conservation measures
cost less than the wholesale price of water for hydraulic fracturing in Texas. The
box plot of water price shows the 1st and 3rd quartiles within the boxes. The lines
extending beyond the box, or whiskers, show the data outside of those quartiles. The
price paid for mining water does not include transaction costs which vary regionally.
(Figure created by the authors based on analysis and data from private operators
and [1–20,23]).
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move toward integrated partnerships that benefit irrigators and oil and gas opera-
tors rather than existing adaptive strategies to combat water stress. This energy-
agriculture partnership could work in areas where water allocations are nearing their
maximum capacity. When water is inexpensive, it is not cost-effective to save it or
make investments to reduce consumption. However, when water is expensive, or if
there is a buyer who will pay a lot for it, there is an economic incentive to reduce
usage either to reduce costs or to gain revenues in the sale of water.
A trade instigated by the irrigator or the oil and gas company would be pos-
sible in a market. A proposal by either party during negotiations for water exchange
brought on by oil and gas operators in need of water could instigate a trade. Simi-
larly, irrigators seeking capital for efficiency investment could post volumes available
for lease. The latter would be less likely as few existing portals exist through which
to advertise such a sale. However, by investing in efficiency measures, an irrigator
or irrigation district could sell more water without reaching a limit (if there is one)
or otherwise overdrawing their resources (if there is not a limit). The cross-sectoral
investment could be proposed by the irrigators, possibly in an effort to reap extended
benefits from the surge in capital or for other reasons or by the oil and gas company,
possibly for increased public approval or other social benefit. For example, South-
western Energy mitigates the impacts of its hydraulic fracturing operations on the en-
vironment by rehabilitating lost wetlands or creating a new habitat in Arkansas [188].
4.4.4 Profits for Water Trades
To determine economic benefit of conserving water, the cost to conserve water
is determined and compared to the price of water as determined in Section 3.2.4.
The net profit of water lease, pi, is calculated as the benefit of leasing water
(price of water, p, multiplied by the volume of water sold, V ) less the cost of water
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savings (cost per volume of water saved Cvol multiplied by the volume of water con-
served, Vws). Profit calculated for each BMP in this chapter is shown in Table 4.1.
The lost cost of water associated with selling without conserving in the baseline sce-
nario is estimated from the average value of irrigation, reported as $4.7 billion in 2007
for 5.9 trillion gallons of water use [189]. The average value of that water is $0.98 per
kgal in 2018 dollars. This value for agriculture is similar to values reported by Cooley
et al. for crops in California [190]. Foregoing the profit of growing agriculture with
water and selling it yields a net profit of $13.82 under a high oil price scenario and
$6.42 under a low oil price scenario (50% of the price reported by Cook and Webber
2016 [171]). All options for agriculture conservation analyzed yield a profit in a water
trade. Three options yield an increased profit over the baseline. The cases analyzed
with WEAP are technology agnostic, so any of the three options in Table 4.1 could
be used to save and sell water at a profit.
4.4.5 Third Party Effects and Transaction Costs
Third party effects, such as conflicts between consumptive and in situ water
uses, are important but not usually considered in water market analysis (Edwards
et al Murray Darling working paper). These effects might create issues for water
trades involving hydraulic fracturing as water would be consumed in hydraulic frac-
turing operations rather than discharged to the watershed as in agriculture operations.
However, water withdrawn from the Rio Grande is discharged to the Arroyo Colorado.
Regional water markets, as opposed to state- or basin-wide markets, often cre-
ate pockets of favorable market conditions– water rights are defined clearly with low
transaction costs [165]. Because of the existing vibrant water market in the Lower Rio
Grande, the water market and its transaction costs are examined at this level rather
than as part of the state-wide system. The watermaster keeps current water balances
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Table 4.1: Average profit associated with conserving and selling water to oil and gas
operations are shown for low and high oil price scenarios. Profits are reported as
U.S. dollars per kgal of water, in terms of seller’s benefits. Six options for agriculture
water conservation yield a profit in a water trade.
Best Management
Practice
Cost to
Conserve
[$/kgal water]
Profit, Low
Oil Price
[$/kgal water]
Profit, High
Oil Price
[$/kgal water]
Furrow Dikes $0.23 $7.17 $14.57
Brush Management $0.01 $7.39 $14.79
Gated and flexible pipe for
field water distribution
systems
$0.07 $7.33 $14.73
Tailwater recovery $2.23 $5.17 $12.57
Sell $6.42 $13.82
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for each water right holder [191]. The watermaster acts as a broker of water, and
individuals interested in purchasing or leasing water can get information on available
water from the watermaster relatively inexpensively over the phone [191]. Water price
is determined by negotiation between buyers and sellers, allowing price to fluctuate
based on supply and demand [191]. Water rights are protected via monitoring by
TCEQ.
Transaction costs incurred in the water market in the Lower Rio Grande Valley
in Texas are captured by the watermaster department at the TCEQ. Water rights
holders in the Lower Rio Grande Basin, the Concho River Basin, and river basins
in South Texas pay TCEQ for permits, licenses, and fees [46]. These funds are then
allocated toward administrative costs of the watermaster offices [192]. While water
rights in the Rio Grande watermaster area account for the majority of water market
activity in watermaster service areas, they account for 40% of diversions by volume.
Assuming water rights fees are proportional to the amount of diversion, water rights
holders on the Rio Grande pay their watermaster $627,000, or $0.04 per gallon ($0.01
per m3) of water in 2013–2014 [46]. Water transactions in the basin draw $2,350,000
in sales and leases over the same period, meaning transaction costs account for 21%
of total water costs [192]. A transaction cost of $0.04 per gallon is approximately 30%
the cost of the average purchase price of agriculture water between 2009 and 2014.
However, it is approximately 0.23% of the average purchase price of mining water over
the same period. Additional transaction costs are associated with increased irrigation
analysis and water monitoring. This cost fits within ranges found in previous work
in which water market transaction costs range from 8–34% [166–170].
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4.5 Discussion
Of the four research questions laid out in Chapter 1, questions 1, 2, and 4 were
explored in this chapter in the context of the Lower Rio Grande Basin. To summarize,
(1) options are available to reduce fresh water use in the Rio Grande Basin, (2) low
cost conservation options are available within the agriculture sector, and (4) if the
energy sector paid for water, the low-cost fresh water reduction methods available
could be implemented economically and offset about 30% of the water demand for oil
and gas activity in this basin.
In this analysis, scenarios are evaluated to assess potential for trading irrigation
savings from implementation of best management practices for use in oil and gas
operations. Results show that if watermaster area irrigation districts conserve 15%
of their water allocation, up to 900 million gallons per year could be made available
for use in oil and gas operations at a cost offset by the price of water. While 900
million gallons might not be much water for a municipality, it is enough to provide
about 30% of the 3 billion gallons of water demanded per year in 2016 and 2017 for
hydraulically fractured wells.
This work highlights best management practices (BMPs) that result in a ben-
efit to the agriculture or municipal water user. On average, the use of furrow dikes
(small dams for each ridge between a planted row of crops), gated and flexible pipe
(to prevent seepage in irrigation channels and furrows), and brush management to
reduce fresh water consumption could be accomplished at a net economic benefit to
the irrigator. Tailwater recovery is a more expensive method; the cost is sometimes
offset by the price of water but not at a benefit to the irrigator over simply selling
their water.
Reliability, resilience, and vulnerability of supply are evaluated to determine
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the effect on the irrigators of selling their water. Irrigation districts would experi-
ence an increase in reliability of their supply, meaning their full demand is estimated
to be satisfied more frequently (another benefit in addition to the increased profit
associated with selling conserved water). Vulnerability and resilience are generally
unchanged. Evaluating water allocations in terms of these performance parameters
allows planners to assess the likelihood of failure to water meet demand (deficit), re-
covery from previous deficit, and average magnitude of deficit. Consideration of these
metrics helps in addressing negative consequences of reallocation of water resources.
Finally, it should be noted that this analysis does not fully address transac-
tion costs. Trades occur frequently with low transaction costs in this basin due to
the transparency associated with record-keeping and arbitration by the watermas-
ter. However, additional negotiation, capital, and operations expenses that should be
evaluated before engaging in water conservation surplus trading are not included in
this work.
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Chapter 5
Objective 3: Inactive Surface Water Market
5.1 Apply the Model to an Inactive Surface Water Market
In this section, the integrated, geographically-resolved hydrologic model is
applied to a potential surface water market on the Brazos River, shown in Figure 5.1.
The river supplies many users based on a priority allocation system. In a case in which
a user did not receive its allocated water, under Texas state law, that user can call the
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) to request that users with a
lesser priority be cut-off from accessing water with a result that the more senior users
would receive their allocation. The action has been used on the Brazos, resulting in
water deficits for lower priority farmers, cities, and power plants and causing health
and safety concerns. Because of the desire to manage water more effectively and
attempt to ensure even lower priority users receive water, a watermaster like that of
the Rio Grande Basin has been established for the river.
Water trades in a market could pay for the cost of conservation and making
those trades could lead to more reliable water supplies for those involved. This hy-
pothesis is evaluated using the integrated, geographically-resolved hydrologic model
with the WAM and WRAP programs.
5.2 Market Framework and Participants
Surface Water: Prior Appropriation
Water on the Brazos River is allocated via Prior Appropriation, where a permit
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Figure 5.1: The Brazos River in Texas is the focus of this analysis.
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to withdraw water is based not on land ownership but on the point in time at which the
permit or ”water right” was acquired [43]. A discussion of this system of water rights
is included in Chapter 2 of this work. Because appropriative rights exist separate from
land ownership, they can be bought, sold, leased, or transferred, forming the basis for
a surface water market. However, because water use is evaluated based on beneficial
use, users might not be interested in altering authorities to the existence of surplus
water. The priority system is often termed ”use it or lose it” because rights holders
must use their entire volume or lose their right to it. The system often encourages
wasteful water use. A market on this river system could allow potentially unused
water to be leased to another water user under the original water right, creating an
economic incentive to conserve where one might not have existed previously.
A watermaster, similar to that for the Rio Grande in Texas, has been estab-
lished for the Brazos River. It is assumed in this work that the watermaster will
eventually be able to function as more than an authority on water withdrawals, but
as an information center for possible water needs and surpluses as well as a mon-
itoring and enforcement agent able to handle third party effect claims. Under the
previous system without a watermaster, water withdrawals were permitted but not
directly monitored, meaning water allocations were not exact and junior water rights,
in particular, were affected by low flows.
5.2.1 Market Participants
The Brazos river has multiple types of users at various priority, irrelevant
to the type of use– although irrigators and power plants, in particular, have older
priority rights compared to cities as irrigation pre-dates municipal growth in much
of the state. The Brazos River Authority also operates many water rights on the
river. In 2020, the Texas Water Development Board estimates water needs from
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the irrigation, municipal, mining sectors (including hydraulic fracturing) throughout
the basin, the power sector in certain counties, and the manufacturing sector at the
mouth of the river will be unmet. Some water needs will be supplied by water supply
projects at the local and regional level. However, some needs might still go unmet,
possibly leading to over-extraction of aquifers or water shortages. Users with water
needs could participate as demands in a water market. Here I assume only oil and gas
operators would participate as buyers in the market and set prices, but other users
could participate, as well. For reference, oil and gas operations in the Brazos River
Basin are shown in Figure 5.2.
Irrigation Water Consumption
Water demand reduction points in the Brazos River basin are identified as
outlined in Section 3.2.4. Irrigation efficiency varies throughout the basin. Thirty-one
counties in the basin have irrigation application efficiencies between 0–40%, another
four have application efficiencies between 41–50%, another fourteen have application
efficiencies between 51–60% percent, and another seven have application efficiencies
between 61–70%. Counties with large irrigated acreage and low application efficiencies
are targets for analysis. In the Brazos River basin, twenty-nine counties have over
500 acres of irrigated farmland and estimated application efficiencies of less than
70%. For future market transactions, site-specific analyses are needed to determine
actual application potential for BMPs. For this analysis, it is assumed that water
consumption could be reduced to similar application efficiencies found in other parts
of Texas.
An application efficiency of 10 acre-feet per acre (approximately 3.3 million
gallons per acre) is common in the regions of Texas that grow rice, a very water-
intense crop. Yet, other regions of Texas, including those in the Brazos River Basin,
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Figure 5.2: This model of market transactions seeks to supply users paying high prices
for water: oil and gas operations in the middle Brazos.
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Table 5.1: Cases of agricultural irrigation conservation assessed in the WAM/WRAP
analysis of the Brazos River.
Agriculture Cases Diversion
[Mgal]
Control
Points
Savings
[Mgal]
Case 1: Irrigation less than
0.7 million gallons per acre
18,205 79 14,096
Case 2: Irrigation less than
3.3 million gallons per acre
1,125 20 769
irrigate at levels exceeding 3.3 million gallons per acre per year, as shown in Figure
5.3. If all irrigated acres in the Brazos used less than 3.3 million gallons per acre per
year, 1.6 billion gallons per year could be saved. However, not all irrigators possess
their own water rights; therefore, the incentive to conserve and sell excess water is
not as obvious. Instead, if all irrigation users with their own surface water rights
were to implement consumption reducing management practices to achieve this level
of conservation, 1.1 billion gallons could be saved per year, as shown in Table 5.1.
An application efficiency of 2 acre-feet per acre (approximately 0.7 million
gallons per acre) is common in the water scarce regions of west Texas. Regions in
the Brazos River Basin irrigate at levels exceeding 0.7 million gallons per acre per
year. If all irrigated acres in the Brazos used less than 0.7 million gallons per acre per
year, 92 billion gallons per year could be saved. If all irrigation users with their own
surface water rights were to implement consumption reducing management practices
to achieve this level of conservation, 18.2 billion gallons could be saved per year, as
shown in Table 5.1. Counties in the Brazos River Basin irrigating at an intensity over
3.3 million gallons per acre and over 0.7 million gallons per acre are shown in 5.3.
Municipal Water Consumption
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Figure 5.3: Water consumption per irrigated acre is shown for counties in the Brazos
River Basin. Those irrigating at an intensity over 3.3 million gallons per acre are
shown in dark blue. Those irrigating between 0.7 and 3.3 million gallons per acre are
shown in green.
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Water demand reduction potential of the municipal sector is also evaluated.
The average system water loss is 16%, but potential losses could be decreased to ap-
proximately 4%. System water loss is identified through self reporting to the TWDB.
More on this topic is included in Chapter 2 of this work.
Most systems exceed the target ideal water loss. Seven municipal water sup-
pliers are identified with over 30% system water loss and another thirty-one municipal
water suppliers with 15–30% system water loss in the Brazos watershed [193]. Of these
systems, ten municipal water providers withdraw surface water from the Brazos River
via water right and exceed 15% system water losses. Reducing water withdrawals to
15%, just below the national average, could save 12.5 billion gallons of water per
year, as shown in Table 5.2. Reducing water losses to 5% of total, slightly above the
ideal savings, could conserve 31.1 billion gallons of water per year, as shown in Table
5.2. These systems have an incentive to participate in a market that could help them
reduce system loss, reduce money spent in treating unsold water, and profit from the
water lease.
Additional water savings could be incurred at the municipal level through
application of best management practices including private or public landscape pro-
grams involving improved monitoring or plant replacement. More on this topic is
included in Chapter 2 of this work. Assuming an average amount of conserved water
savings at municipalities with rights to water on the Brazos River, approximately
29.2 billion gallons of water could be saved per year, as shown in Table 5.2.
Water Consumption by Thermoelectric Power Plants
Power plants can reduce their water demand through use of more water-
efficient cooling technologies, more efficient prime movers, and more water-lean fuels.
Nine power plants in this basin use once-through (open-loop) cooling with or without
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Table 5.2: Cases of municipal conservation assessed in the WAM/WRAP analysis of
the Brazos River.
Municipal Cases Diversion
[Mgal]
Control
Points
Savings
[Mgal]
Municipal Case 1: Reduce
Water Loss to 15%
12,533 10 438
Municipal Case 2: Reduce
Water Loss to 5%
31,115 21 1,894
Municipal Case 3: Munici-
pal Water Conservation
29,165 19 2,203
a cooling pond or recirculating (closed-loop) cooling with a cooling pond rather than
more water-efficient systems–cooling towers, hybrid cooling, or dry cooling. Switch-
ing from once-through cooling to hybrid or dry cooling will not conserve consumed
water. However, augmenting a cooling tower with a dry cooling system or switching
to dry cooling could conserve water that would normally be evaporated out of the
watershed. For this analysis, seven power plants are analyzed. Three power plants
have open-cooling systems, meaning water saved could have been discharged and used
by others downstream. In these cases, conserving released water could cause third
party effects to downstream users. Four power plants have water-lean cooling towers
but could conserve that consumed water in a water market environment. Four of
the power plants are analyzed individually as the volume saved could supply the full
demand of oil and gas activity in the northern Eagle Ford Shale. Three power plants
are modeled together as a single analysis to provide a larger combined total water
savings. Water savings for hybrid cooling replacements are assumed to be half of the
original water diversion as is seen in the literature [152].
Water savings for dry cooling replacements are assumed to be approximately
79
10% of what a cooling tower would use. For power plants using a cooling tower, the
diversion was reduced by 90%. For power plants using a once-through system, the
consumption for dry cooling is calculated as that required for a cooling tower. An
air-cooled power plant would likely use approximately 10% of that consumed by a
cooling tower for its toilets and other on-site water demands [157]. The calculation
for cooling tower water consumption is shown in Equation 5.1.
Q = εfG (5.1)
The calculation for dry cooling water consumption is shown in Equation 5.2.
Q = 0.1× εfG (5.2)
Using methods employed by [157], Q represents the annual diversion [gallons]. The
constant ε is a dimensionless ratio of diversion over consumption for cooling towers,
reported as 1.25 by Stillwell et al. 2011 [152]. The variable f represents water
consumption for power generation [gallons/MWh], and G represents net generation
at the power plant of interest [MWh]. Water consumption for power generation was
determined as a function of fuel, cooling technology, and river basin using data for
previous consumption reported to the Energy Information Administration [194,195].
Hybrid and dry cooling scenarios modeled in this analysis are shown in Table 5.3;
estimated savings of switching cooling technology varies between 1.4 and 10.5 billion
gallons of saved consumptive fresh water per power plant per year.
5.3 Water Allocation Model: WAM and WRAP
After identifying users, hydrologic water allocation model is used to assess the
amount of available water that might be made available for other uses. Surface water
use is the main focus as it is the main source of water for most users in the lower basin
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Table 5.3: Cases of conservation of water consumption for thermoelectric power gen-
eration assessed in the WAM/WRAP analysis of the Brazos River.
Power Cases Diversion
[Mgal]
Control
Points
Savings
[Mgal]
Power Plants 1-3, Hybrid
Cooling
3,626 3 1,813
Power Plant 4, Hybrid
Cooling
11,275 1 8,766
Power Plant 5, Hybrid
Cooling
7,553 1 3,777
Power Plant 6, Hybrid
Cooling
4,301 1 2,151
Power Plant 7, Hybrid
Cooling
2,737 1 1,369
Power Plants 1-3, Dry Cool-
ing
3,626 3 3,358
Power Plant 4, Dry Cooling 11,275 1 10,486
Power Plant 5, Dry Cooling 7,553 1 6,798
Power Plant 6, Dry Cooling 4,301 1 3,871
Power Plant 7, Dry Cooling 2,737 1 2,725
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and because it is consistent with the policy framework– Texas water law considers
surface water and groundwater separately.
To conduct this analysis, an existing river basin-based model of Texas surface
water rights holders is adapted: the Water Availability Model used in the Water
Rights Analysis Package. A discussion of the WAM/WRAP model is included in
Section 3.2.3. The model was developed by Wurbs [174] and is regularly used to assess
water availability for application for water rights to rivers in Texas. In addition, the
WAM/WRAP model was previously used to evaluate the technological and economic
feasibility of alternative cooling technologies at thermoelectric power plants and an
evaluation of changes in reliability of supply based on increased surface water storage
[175]. Current conditions are modeled and then edited within the WAMS to reflect
addition of temporary water rights users intended to reflect oil and gas water use and
reductions in water demand at sites identified for water conservation and lease.
The WAM includes control points for water rights with diversion amount,
location, and priority. A full execution of water rights is employed in this analysis.
These conditions are modeled using the existing surface water diversions. The WAM
is then amended to allow decreases in diversions at control points conserving water
and increases in diversions at control points receiving saved water. After amending
the WAM and executing the model using the Water Rights Analysis Package [174],
results are organized using post-processing algorithms. A summary of each set of
scenarios is included in Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3.
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5.4 Assessing Potential Costs and Benefits
5.4.1 Water Deliveries
As shown in Table 5.4, all scenarios could provide millions of gallons of saved
water, ranging from 356 million to 10.5 billion gallons of water depending on the user
and conservation method. However, costs of conservation vary as shown in Figures
5.9, 5.10, 5.11. Similarly, the benefit of implementing conservation strategies for the
original water right holder varies, as well, as shown in Tables 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7.
5.4.2 Reliability, Resilience, and Vulnerability
Results of the WAM executions for each scenario are evaluated based on sta-
tistical parameters: reliability, resilience, and vulnerability. A discussion of the math-
ematics and importance of these parameters is included in Section 3.2.5.
In most cases, basin-wide reliability, resilience, and vulnerability is unchanged
when comparing current conditions to cases of conservation, lease, and use in down-
stream oil and gas operations because changes for individual users are averaged across
all users. However, for the agriculture cases, under increased irrigation conservation
(Agriculture Case 1), basin-wide reliability decreases by 2% and resilience decreases
by 1% for the entire period 1940–1997. Under drought conditions, reliability de-
creases. For the drought of record period, 1950–1957, reliability decreases by 3%
compared to current conditions. Agriculture Case 2 also sees a decrease of 1% in
basin-wide reliability during drought conditions.
Third party effects are not apparent when viewing reliability, resilience, and
vulnerability only at the basin scale. Instead, these results are able to be displayed
graphically using ESRI ArcGIS geographic information systems. Instream flows could
benefit from upstream releases to downstream buyers or could be impacted by these
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Table 5.4: Average Volume Supplied by Conservation Cases.
Conservation Cases Average Volume Supplied
[Mgal]
Power Plants 1-3, Hybrid Cooling 1,813
Power Plant 4, Hybrid Cooling 8,766
Power Plant 5, Hybrid Cooling 3,777
Power Plant 6, Hybrid Cooling 1,963
Power Plant 7, Hybrid Cooling 1,368
Power Plants 1-3, Dry Cooling 3,358
Power Plant 4, Dry Cooling 10,486
Power Plant 5, Dry Cooling 6,798
Power Plant 6, Dry Cooling 3,871
Power Plant 7, Dry Cooling 2,725
Municipal Case 1 420
Municipal Case 2 1,893
Municipal Case 3 2,219
Agriculture Case 1 4,109
Agriculture Case 2 356
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Figure 5.4: Trading could cause negative impact on instream flows due to moving
water withdrawal control points upstream to supply water trades.
flows due to moving water withdrawal control points upstream to supply water trades.
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 show the theoretical effect of such trades. The negative impact
on instream flows is a cost that trades in an unregulated market do not take into
account.
Examples of the application of the performance parameters reliability, re-
silience, and vulnerability are shown in Figures 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8. Figure 5.6 shows a
general increase in reliability, or frequency to receive demand in full, for many indi-
viduals in the basin. Figure 5.7 shows a general decrease in resilience, or ability to
recover after a deficit, for many individuals in the basin. One consideration in the
calculation of resilience is when reliability increases, resilience might decrease simply
as a result of less deficit periods occurring. Figure 5.8 shows some users experiencing
small increases or decreases in vulnerability compared to the baseline, meaning deficits
increase or decrease on average, respectively, for the individual users in question.
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Figure 5.5: Trading could create a benefit for instream flows due to upstream releases
to downstream buyers.
5.4.3 Costs and Benefits of Water Sales
The cost of conserving water in agriculture fluctuates by technology and man-
agement method. Figure 5.9 includes costs for irrigation best management practices
possible for Brazos valley irrigators, as well as the general cost of agriculture conser-
vation ascribed by the Texas Water Development Boards State Water Plan for 2017.
These costs are compared to the range of prices for water seen in the oil and gas
sector.
The cost of water loss reduction varies, as well. The San Francisco Public
Utilities Commission, Nashville Public Works, and Las Vegas Valley Water District
performed detailed water audits, detected, and repaired leaks for a total of $1,347,
$976, and $1,424 per million gallons, respectively [196]. Detecting and repairing leaks
at the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power cost $1,065 per million gallons
saved [196]. Water loss and control programs at the California Department of Water
Recourses, Orange County Utilities, and another large utility in the western United
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Figure 5.6: After trading for saved water under Municipal Case 2, many users benefit
from improved reliability and some users experiences reduced reliability. All decreases
in reliability are under 15% compared to the baseline.
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Figure 5.7: After trading for saved water under Municipal Case 2, many users benefit
from improved resilience and some users experience reduced resilience. Two users
experience large reductions in resilience (more than 15% compared to the baseline).
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Figure 5.8: After trading for saved water under Municipal Case 2, some users expe-
rience a small increase in vulnerability (less than 15% compared to baseline). One
experiences a small decrease in vulnerability.
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Figure 5.9: Cost of irrigation best management practices varies but is, generally, much
lower than the price paid for water used by oil and gas operators.
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States cost $2,019, $1,421, and $976 per million gallons saved [196]. Low end for
Texas which estimates water loss control and reduction at an average $4,588 per
million gallons of water saved per year (assuming a 60 year planning period) [21].
Texas estimates are used in this chapter.
The cost of saving water through specific landscape programs that incentivize
replacement of turfgrass for native plants (cash-for-grass) was evaluated in select
programs across the United States by Hilaire et al. in 2008 [115]. Costs range from
$0.55 (Albuquerque, NM) to $1.33 (El Paso, TX) per square foot of grass [115].
Annual calculated water savings ranged from 18–62 gallons per square foot of turf
[115]. Cost per thousand gallons of water saved is $21 in North Marin Water District,
CA and Southern Nevada, $29 in Albuquerque, NM, and $74 in El Paso, TX [115].
The Southern Nevada Water Authority helped replace 125 million square feet of
turf, saving nearly 7 billion gallons annually [102]. More recently, San Antonio,
TX offered $100 per 200 square feet ($0.50 per square foot) for up to 1,600 total
square feet of lawn replacement with a required irrigation audit before and after lawn
replacement [197]. Assuming a similar range of water savings seen in 2008, this water
replacement program would result in a cost of $8–28 per thousand gallons saved.
These costs are updated to the 2018 value of the dollar and reported in Figure 5.10.
Technology changes at power plants are expensive decisions. Moreover, water-
lean thermoelectric power cooling technologies have an efficiency penalty on the heat
rate of the plant, and therefore require more fuel per unit of energy generated [157].
The cost of replacing cooling technologies, including the expense of an efficiency
penalty, is calculated using values reported in Stillwell and Webber, 2013 [198] and
is included in Figure 5.11. It is assumed that the power plants using hybrid cooling
would implement a dry cooling system in addition to the current wet cooling tech-
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Figure 5.10: Cost of municipal best management practices and water loss reduction
and control could potentially be offset by the price paid for water used by oil and gas
operators. However, in some cases the cost for conservation is greater than price of
water.
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Figure 5.11: Cost of retrofitting a power plant with dry cooling or hybrid cooling
technology is, generally, greater than the price paid for water used in oil and gas
operations.
nology. Therefore, the cost of hybrid cooling in this study is assumed to be the same
as the cost for dry cooling. However, in situations where a wet cooling system is also
required, the cost for hybrid cooling will be greater than that for wet cooling [198].
Generally, even at a low price paid for water by oil and gas operators, agri-
culture technology costs could be covered in whole at a payback period of ten years
and an interest rate offered by the TWDB, as discussed in Section 3.2.4. Municipal
water conservation and in some cases, municipal loss repair, could also be paid for
by the price paid by oil and gas operators. However, in very few cases would a re-
placement of cooling technology be offset by the price paid for water. In a market
environment in which least cost options are selected first, oil and gas operators would
likely select conservation of agriculture, then municipal uses and losses, and finally
93
water consumed by power plants.
5.4.4 Profits for Water Trades
To determine economic benefit of conserving water, the cost to conserve water
is determined and compared to the price of water as determined in Section 3.2.4.
The net profit of water lease, pi, is calculated as the benefit of leasing water
(price of water, p, multiplied by the volume of water sold, V ) less the cost of water
savings (cost per volume of water saved Cvol multiplied by the volume of water con-
served, Vws). Profit calculated for each irrigation BMP in this chapter is shown in
Table 5.5. As outlined in Chapter 4, foregoing the profit of growing agriculture with
water and selling it yields a net profit of $13.82 under a high oil price scenario and
$6.42 under a low oil price scenario (50% of the price reported by Cook and Webber
2016 [171]). All options for agriculture conservation analyzed yield a profit in a water
trade. Six options yield an increased profit over the baseline. The cases analyzed
in the WAM/WRAP allocation analysis are technology agnostic, so any of the six
options in Table 5.5 could be used to save and sell water at a profit.
Profit calculated for each municipal BMP in this chapter is shown in Table
5.6. The lost cost of water associated with selling without conserving in the baseline
scenario is estimated from the average water rate for 2017, $37.31 per 5,000 gallons.
Under a hypothetical scenario in which water is sold to oil and gas operations rather
than selling to a municipal use, there is foregone profit associated with the sale that
yields a net profit of $7.37 under a high oil price scenario and a loss of $0.03 under a
low oil price scenario (50% of the price reported by [171]). Two of the three municipal
conservation options yield a profit in a water trade and an increased profit over the
baseline. Municipal cases 1 and 2 analyzed in the WAM/WRAP represent reductions
in water loss, and municipal case 3 represents general conservation. All three cases
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Table 5.5: Profit associated with conserving and selling water to oil and gas operations
are shown for low and high oil price scenarios. Profits are reported as U.S. dollars
per kgal, in terms of seller’s benefits. Six options for agriculture water conservation
yield a profit in a water trade.
BMP Cost to
Conserve
[$/kgal]
Low Oil
Price
[$/kgal]
High Oil
Price
[$/kgal]
Furrow Dikes $0.23 $7.17 $14.57
Brush Management $0.01 $7.39 $14.79
Drip/micro-irrigation $0.11 $7.29 $14.69
Gated and flexible pipe for
field water distribution sys-
tems
$0.07 $7.33 $14.73
Tailwater recovery $2.23 $5.17 $12.57
Center pivot sprinkler $0.04 $7.36 $14.76
Land leveling $1.98 $5.42 $12.82
Surge flow $0.07 $7.33 $14.73
Sell $6.42 $13.82
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Table 5.6: Profit associated with conserving and selling water to oil and gas operations
are shown for low and high oil price scenarios. Profits are reported as U.S. dollars
per kgal, in terms of seller’s benefits. Two options for municipal water conservation
yield a profit in a water trade.
BMP Cost to
Conserve
[$/kgal]
Low Oil Price
[$/kgal]
High Oil Price
[$/kgal]
Cash for
Grass
$37.43 ($30.03) ($22.63)
General
Municipal
$4.89 $2.51 $9.91
Water Loss $4.12 $3.28 $10.68
Sell ($0.03) $7.37
result in increased profit over the baseline.
Profit calculated for selling water saved from dry or hybrid cooling is shown
in Table 5.7. The lost cost of water associated with selling without conserving in
the baseline scenario is estimated from the water consumption per mdalegawatt-hour
(MWh) generated and the value of energy generated in the Electric Reliability Council
of Texas in 2017 (27.47 $/MWh). Under a hypothetical scenario in which water is
sold to oil and gas operations rather than used to cool a power plant generating
electricity, the sale yields a net loss of $13.51 under a high oil price scenario and a
loss of $20.91 under a low oil price scenario (50% of the price reported by [171]). Even
under the lowest value of water, shown in Table 5.7, conserving and selling water from
thermoelectric power plants does not generate a profit for the power plant in a water
trade.
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Table 5.7: Profit associated with conserving and selling water from thermoelectric
power plants to oil and gas operations are shown for low and high oil price scenarios.
Profits are reported as U.S. dollars per kgal, in terms of seller’s benefits. Conserving
water used for thermoelectric power does not generate a profit in a water trade.
BMP Cost to
Conserve
[$/kgal]
Low Oil Price
[$/kgal]
High Oil Price
[$/kgal]
Dry/Hybrid
Cooling
$25.50 ($18.10) ($10.70)
Sell ($20.91) ($13.51)
5.4.5 Transaction Costs
There will be transaction costs associated with water traded in a market on
the Brazos River. Specifically, some oil and gas wells are closer to the river than
others. While some wells could experience lower conveyance costs associated with
retrieving water from the Brazos River. Conveyance costs could be quite high for
wells up that are up to 30 miles from the main river. Depending on the type of water
transfer used and whether multiple wells operate separately or together to transfer
water, the cost of transferring traded water might make total water costs prohibitive,
negating any benefits of trading water in a market.
Transition costs in a relatively unregulated, unmonitored market such as the
Brazos will likely be higher than those in the active market of the Rio Grande Val-
ley. Under all conditions, a site-specific water audit or technical analysis should be
conducted to determine actual costs and savings. This site analysis is part of the
transaction costs associated with a water transfer. In addition, in some cases, there
will also be non-beneficial third party effects. The newly instated water master could
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play a role in monitoring and mitigating these costs and externalities as well as in
outlining property rights and assessing and disseminating water supply and trade
information to reduce the costs of these externalities and streamline a market envi-
ronment.
Managing water through a watermaster incurs administrative costs. TCEQ
allocated 1.3 million U.S. dollars between 2014 and 2015 towards creation of a new
watermaster on the Brazos River in Texas [192]. Water right holders see an additional
transaction cost via an annual fee of $50 plus a use fee based on authorized amount
of water and type of use [199]. In other basins, costs imposed by current institutional
choices on future efforts to reverse or alter water use patterns and infrastructure,
otherwise known as institutional lock-in costs, prevent changes to the system [168].
However, keeping the Texas legal system in its current status as an unregulated
market, potentially resulting in depleted aquifers and impacts on estuaries, is a cost of
its own [166,200]. Prior appropriation yields third party effects on junior water rights
holders, especially if trade moves water downstream of junior water right holders [200].
In a correlative right system like the Lower Rio Grande Valley, all users share in
losses or gains in supply due to drought or precipitation and water shortages are not
unequally applied to those newer users [200]. Water markets are more economically
efficient and provide private and social benefits compared to policies encouraging
irrigation efficiency through subsidies [83]. A step change in policy similar to that
used in Australia might be necessary to change Texas’ water policy direction toward
a system more favorable to market transactions [168]. Iterative reforms, including
informal trading, diversion limits, water rights reform, and adaptation, took hold over
three decades in the Murray-Darling Basin in Australia [168]. If this gradual policy
development is used as an example in Texas, policies should be directed at water trade
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while minimizing concerns over where the water goes or how it is used [200]. Effective
institutional investment in transition costs yields stable transaction costs [165].
5.5 Discussion
Of the four research questions laid out in Chapter 1, questions 1, 2, and 4 were
explored in this chapter in the context of the Brazos Basin. To summarize, (1) options
are available to reduce fresh water use in the Brazos Basin, (2) low cost conservation
options are available within the agriculture and municipal sectors but not within the
thermoelectric power sector, and (4) if the energy sector paid for water, the low-
cost fresh water reduction methods available could be implemented economically and
offset billions of gallons of demand for oil and gas operations.
In this analysis, scenarios are evaluated to assess potential for trading water
savings from the agriculture, municipal, and thermoelectric power sectors for use in oil
and gas operations. Results show that, generally, irrigation conservation methods are
the least cost choice, followed by municipal conservation, and then water conservation
in thermoelectric power. Low-cost scenarios could provide between 356 million and
4.1 billion gallons of water, depending on the user and conservation method. Thus,
under water trading scenarios, agricultural and municipal users could increase profits
by conserving consumptive uses and selling to oil and gas operations.
This work highlights best management practices (BMPs) that result in a bene-
fit to the agriculture or municipal water user. On average, the use of irrigation BMPs
to reduce fresh water consumption could be accomplished at a net economic benefit
to the irrigator. However, tailwater recovery and land leveling are more expensive
methods; the cost of each is sometimes offset by the price of water but not at a ben-
efit to the irrigator over only selling their water. Reducing municipal water losses,
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reducing turfgrass water use for public landscapes, or implementing rebate programs
for home appliances could result in profitable water savings at the municipal level.
However, cash-for-grass programs and conservation in the thermoelectric power sec-
tor are not profitable at current water prices (though they might be valuable options
for municipalities to consider under increased price or water stress scenarios as they
provide significant amounts of water).
Reliability, resilience, and vulnerability of supply are evaluated to determine
the effect on water users within the Brazos Basin. System level reliability and re-
silience is unchanged in most scenarios. However, in the agriculture cases, reliabil-
ity decreases during drought years. In agriculture case 1, reliability and resilience
both decrease at the system level for all years. In addition, individual users experi-
ence mixed effects. Vulnerability is generally unchanged at the system level. As is
mentioned in Chapter 4, evaluating water allocations in terms of these performance
parameters allows planners to assess the likelihood of failure to water meet demand
(deficit), recovery from previous deficit, and average magnitude of deficit; consider-
ation of these metrics helps in addressing negative consequences of reallocation of
water resources.
Finally, this analysis does not address administrative transaction costs or the
additional negotiation, capital, and operations expenses. Transaction costs should
be evaluated before engaging in water conservation surplus trading. Moreover, be-
cause costs and third party effects of existing reallocations are unmeasured, existing
externalities are currently unmitigated. Future work should consider these costs and
externalities and determine methods to address them. Similarly, this analysis does
not address the political favorability that might be required to engage in public water
conservation with the intent to trade savings to another sector, a component that
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should be included in future analysis of water savings potential, as well.
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Chapter 6
Objective 4: Groundwater Market
6.1 Apply the Model to a Groundwater and Alternative Source
Market
The Permian Basin resides in drought-prone West Texas where many of the
area’s reservoirs were less than 3% full in 2014 [201]. The Permian Basin sits under
the Ogallala Aquifer in the northern part of the basin and under the Edwards-Trinity
Aquifer in the southern part of the basin. Landowners selling fresh water to oil and
gas operations supply water from these two aquifers.
The Permian Basin has historically experienced ups and downs of oil produc-
tion. With the increase of hydraulic fracturing, horizontal drilling, and discoveries
of now economically accessible reserves, oil production has increased. With increas-
ing production comes an increase in water use and water purchases. The market for
groundwater in the Permian Basin is assessed with special consideration of Ground-
water Conservation District (GCD) policies on withdrawal and export.
Because of the groundwater policy system in Texas, discussed in Chapter 2,
unregulated groundwater marketing leads to over-extraction of the resource. Use of
alternative water sources, treated and marketed for use for oil and gas activities in
the Permian Basin, could provide a potential remedy to this groundwater extraction.
Use of non-fresh water resources could be achieved at a cost lower than the price paid
for fresh groundwater, reducing the third-party effects of fresh groundwater use on
aquifers in that region, including potential drawdown and increased energy costs for
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pumping.
6.2 Market Framework and Participants
6.2.1 Groundwater Policy: Rule of Capture and Groundwater Conserva-
tion Districts
The Permian Basin region is supplied mainly by fresh groundwater. In contrast
to its governance of surface water, the State of Texas does not incorporate permitting
or judgments on reasonable use of water into its groundwater policy. Groundwater
in Texas follows the Rule-of-Capture, attributing the right to withdraw groundwater
to the landowner residing above that water and providing that, absent malice or
willful waste, landowners can withdraw as much water as they want without incurring
liability, even if that withdrawal will inhibit access to water by neighboring landowners
[47]. More discussion of the Rule of Capture, in context with other groundwater
policies is included in Chapter 2.
Because groundwater is a property right, it can be bought, sold, or traded.
However, no explicit allocation is attributed to these rights. Meaning, due to knowl-
edge that neighbors might exploit or sell the shared water beneath their land, no
single user has an incentive to conserve water for later use [49]. Landowners are
instead inclined to over-exploit their groundwater resources [49].
A groundwater conservation district (GCD) authorized by the Texas Legis-
lature can protect and manage groundwater resources to maintain supplies in the
area [202]. These districts have the ability to require permits and to place reasonable
restrictions on water withdrawals or well location [203]. Unless restricted by a GCD
or other authority, landowners may withdraw as much water as they need.
Not all areas of the state have GCDs, nor are all areas of the Permian Basin
regulated by GCDs, either. Moreover, water regulations vary by GCD. The Texas
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Association of Groundwater Districts surveyed GCDs about their policies to deter-
mine the patchwork of regulations at GCDs across the state. Results show that ten
GCDs set regulations for water use for hydraulic fracturing in the Permian Basin as
of 2014. Four others were considering regulations at the time. Of the GCDs without
regulations, five consider hydraulic fracturing operations within their district to be
significant. Nine have what they consider to be minimal amounts of hydraulic fractur-
ing. Some GCDs set limits on water production in volume per area per year. Other
limitations might be beneficial use, reasonable use, or available water. Some have no
limits. Eight GCDs in the Permian Basin set production limits between 0.18–1.24
cubic meters per square meter per year. GCDs in the Permian Basin set other limits.
The remaining GCDs do not limit water production. Eleven GCDs limit groundwater
export from their jurisdiction.
Regulations by GCDs allow water use and potential marketing while limiting
over-exploitation. They can also limit a market by requiring permits or levy fees for
water exported out of the district [204–206]. While statewide water trades are made
more difficult, the rules do not inhibit market activity on the regional level within a
district. The Edwards Aquifer Authority is an example of a functioning groundwater
market [204]. To address third-party effects of groundwater transfers in the Edwards
Aquifer, a groundwater right holder cannot sell or lease more than fifty percent of their
irrigation rights [204]. This policy is not in effect in other groundwater conservation
districts, meaning third parties could be impacted without options for recourse.
6.2.2 Market Participants
Hydraulic fracturing is common in the Permian Basin with some counties us-
ing between 108 and 109 gallons in 2011 and more estimated for later years. Water
demands are supplied by landowners with groundwater rights. As discussed in Chap-
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ter 2, compared to the volume injected in hydraulic fracturing oeprations, a large
volume of flowback and produced water (FP) returns to the surface in the Permian
Basin. Treatment without removal of dissolved solids (clean brine), including clarifi-
cation and dosing of chlorine dioxide has been shown to be applicable for reuse in oil
and gas operations [207]. In addition, brackish groundwater and municipal eﬄuent
provide other alternatives to fresh groundwater in the area. As discussed in Chapter
2, some entities use already have contracts for use of municipal eﬄuent.
6.3 Water Allocation Model: Location-Allocation
As mentioned in Chapter 2 and Section 3.2.3.3, groundwater is not allocated
by any policy in Texas. Fresh groundwater and alternative resources are reallocated
from sources based on price. To simulate this price-induced reallocation, a model
of water supplies and demands is constructed within ArcGIS using the location-
allocation network analysis for the Spraberry trend in the Permian Basin in Texas.
An explanation of the algorithms used in location-allocation is included in Section
3.2.3.3. A discussion of the network, facilities, demands, and allocation scenarios in
the location-allocation is included in this section.
6.3.1 Network
Assuming water moves by truck or pipe and pipes can be networked along
the right-of-way of roads, the base network in this location-allocation problem set for
water allocation is the system of roads in the State of Texas as reported by the Texas
Department of Transportation (TxDOT) [26], as shown in Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.1: The target area for the location-allocation network analysis is the
Spraberry trend in the Permian Basin. Wells shown in this figure are reported by
FracFocus [24,25].
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Figure 6.2: The base network for the location-allocation network analysis is the Tx-
DOT road system [26].
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6.3.2 Demands
Demands in this analysis are simulated from past water demands for hydraulic
fracturing reported to FracFocus [24], as shown in Figure 6.3. Water demands are
simulated using frac water demands from 2016 and are limited to the Spraberry trend
in the Permian Basin of West Texas, an active location for oil and gas activity even
during the reduction in activity caused by the low price of oil.
6.3.3 Facilities
This work depends on detailed facility information. Modeled facilities are
sources of water including:
• fresh and brackish groundwater (locations collected TWDB [27]),
• municipal wastewater treatment plants (discharge information collected by [208],
locations reported by [209], and
• supplies of oilfield wastewater injected into disposal wells (locations and supplies
collected by the Railroad Commission and curated by DigitalH2O [28]).
Water is allocated from these facilities to demand sites. Simulation of price-induced
water allocation assumes no existing contracts with landowners, which is not true in
practice, and that companies can share water resources and treatment plants, which
might or might not be true in practice.
Groundwater Supplies
Default fresh groundwater well capacities are set to be proportional to the
modeled available groundwater (MAG) set forth to achieve the desired future condi-
tions (DFC) for the aquifer within each groundwater conservation district (GCD). A
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Figure 6.3: Water demands for wells hydraulically fractured in 2016 are used as a
proxy for future demands in the location-allocation network analysis [24].
109
discussion of the DFC and MAG process is included in Section 3.2.3.3. However, in
this analysis as in practice, groundwater wells are allowed to exceed capacity because
there is no existing policy limit on the amount of fresh groundwater that can be with-
drawn despite a common goal of conservation. Because of this condition, groundwater
over-extraction compared to the MAG is analyzed later in this chapter.
Brackish Groundwater Supplies
Brackish water supplies are unknown in Texas but assumed to be abundant.
Therefore, brackish groundwater supplies are assumed to be much larger than water
demand and no capacity is set. Eﬄuent supplies are assumed to be the permitted
volume of eﬄuent as reported by the Environmental Protection Agency.
Flowback and Produced Water Supplies
Oilfield operations produce wastewater, as discussed in Chapter 2. Supplies
reported as disposed in 2016 are shown in Figure 6.6.
A multitude of options exist for recycling and resupplying flowback and pro-
duced water (FP) for use in oilfield operations. For this analysis, FP water is as-
sumed to be sent to existing disposal well locations (receiving), treated, stored, and
then sold for reuse in another hydraulic fracturing treatment. This analysis assumes
construction of centralized oilfield wastewater treatment facilities, the cost of which
is covered through payment of water and what would have been disposal. Receiv-
ing facilities are assumed to be able to transport to and from centralized treatment
facilities. Treatment facility locations were chosen in a separate location-allocation
analysis weighted to the disposal and frac volumes–those those would participate di-
rectly in use of treatment facilities, thereby reducing cost to transport water to and
from treatment. Figure 6.7 shows the set-up of such a scenario.
A centralized treatment program was chosen because of the ability to treat and
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Figure 6.4: Fresh groundwater wells are common throughout the Spraberry trend,
with a larger concentration in the southern portion of the region [27]. Wells are used
as source facilities in the location-allocation network analysis.
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Figure 6.5: Brackish groundwater wells are common throughout the Spraberry trend,
with a larger concentration in the southern portion of the region [27]. Wells are used
as source facilities in the location-allocation network analysis.
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Figure 6.6: Disposal volumes received in 2016 are used as a proxy for future supplies
in the location-allocation network analysis [28].
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Figure 6.7: A system of centralized treatment with multiple receiving nodes and
treatment facilities is used in the network analysis.
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supply large amounts of water and save on economies of scale in that treatment and
water transport process. Moreover, in the downturn in price of oil from 2014-2016,
the facilities that operated at low prices and large volumes continued to operate while
some companies that offered small well-to-well on-site treatment were pushed out of
the market. A centralized system also benefits the smaller operators that cannot take
advantage of economies of scale to treat and reuse FP water by collecting water from
multiple users to supplement limited flows.
Scenario Analysis
Six scenarios were developed to allocate water by lowest impedance. Impedance
used in these cases is the distance required to transport water. In general, transporta-
tion, whether by truck or by pipeline, is a high-cost component in the acquisition of
water. The six scenarios allocate water of varying quality under varying competition,
meaning some scenarios only allow one or two types of water sources to compete.
The scenarios are intended to mimic an environment in which groundwater might be
the preferred water source by users or alternative water sources (brackish water or
treated produced water) might be required or encouraged. The scenarios allow for
comparison of water choices as well as policy choices that might incentivize certain
water choices. The six scenarios allocate water supplies in competition as follows:
1. Fresh groundwater only (GW)
2. Fresh groundwater, brackish groundwater, treated municipal eﬄuent (GW/BW/Eff)
3. Brackish groundwater only (GW)
4. Brackish groundwater and FP water (BW/FP)
5. FP water only (FP)
115
6. All sources (All Sources)
Water demanded by frac wells within the Spraberry trend amounts to 13.4
billion gallons of water in 2016. Under each scenario, water is allocated to the closest
facility along the road network. In limited cases, the program could not locate supplies
or demands. The distance was added to the model manually for analysis in post-
processing.
6.4 Assessing Potential Costs and Benefits
6.4.1 Water Deliveries
In the singular allocations of fresh groundwater (GW), brackish groundwater
(BW), and flowback/produced water (FP), the entire volume allocated comes from
each of these sources, respectively. In the competitive scenarios, some water is allo-
cated from differing sources. No water is allocated from municipal treatment plants
in this analysis as the transportation from such facilities is beyond that of the other
competitors. Figure 6.8 shows the volume of allocated water from GW, BW, and FP
sources under each of the six scenarios. While many companies in the Permian Basin
use alternative water resources, most companies are still heavily dependent on fresh
water [134]. A fresh groundwater or combination brackish groundwater/fresh ground-
water (simulated by the GW and fresh groundwater/brackish groundwater/eﬄuent
(GW/BW/Eff) scenarios) is normal for many operators in the Spraberry trend. Allo-
cating to lower-cost alternative resources could offset about 9 billion of the total 13.4
billion gallons of water demand (enough to supply the annual residential demand for
240 thousand people1).
1The City of Midland’s residential consumption was reported at 102 gallons per capita per day
in 2016 [193].
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Figure 6.8: Results of the location-allocation network analysis show the volumes of
source water allocated under each of the six scenarios. FP water is generally but not
always the cheapest option.
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Figure 6.9: Results of the location-allocation network analysis show the percent of
supply allocated under each of the six scenarios. FP water is generally but not always
the cheapest option.
Figure 6.9 shows the same allocations as a percent of total allocated water
from fresh groundwater (GW), brackish groundwater (BW), and flowback/produced
water (FP) sources under each of the six scenarios.
In this analysis, water is allocated to minimize distance. Figure 6.10 shows the
average distance traveled to allocate water from GW, BW, and FP sources under each
of the six scenarios. Additionally, Figure 6.11 shows the average distance traveled
to allocate water from all sources included in each of the six scenarios. Generally,
more competition among water sources, particularly when including flowback and
produced water sources, results in shorter transportation distances. However, this
conclusion is a direct result of more water being available nearer to all sources due to
the dispersion of supply. More competition at distances far from demands would not
118
Figure 6.10: The location-allocation network analysis chooses supplies by closest
distance. Average distance for each scenario’s source water supply is shown.
result in shorter distances and shorter travel times.
6.4.2 Costs and Benefits of Water Sales
Distance traveled is important because of the cost associated with traveling
long distances. As of 2018, water is often transported via truck and to a lesser
extent through pipeline, including rented portable lay-flat pipe. Figure 6.12 shows
the general price per well for water transfer via truck and lay-flat pipe for each of
the six scenarios. Lay-flat pipe is a pipe that lays flat, so it can be quickly rolled
or unrolled to lay or retrieve pipe for water transfer. The price assumes a rate of
$85 per hour for trucking and $3 per foot per day for lay-flat pipe. Both prices were
common in the Spraberry area as of 2014 (but might have reduced under the same
conditions that reduced water price since 2014). Transportation speed is assumed to
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Figure 6.11: The location-allocation network analysis chooses supplies by closest
distance. Average distance for all source water in each scenario is shown.
120
Figure 6.12: Cost to transfer water for each scenario is shown. Cost depends on choice
of transfer equipment, distance, and time.
be 30 miles per hour (mph) and a wait time for site traffic, loading, and unloading
of about 10 minutes is added for each truck trip. Truck trips are also assumed to be
roundtrips. These assumptions might hold in some parts of the basin where prices
were recorded but depend on variables like traffic and service company efficiency in
operations. Sensitivity analysis on these assumptions is included below. The cost
tradeoff between truck and pipeline transfer depends on distance as well as timing.
In general, lay-flat pipe is the cheaper option, but a long rental term for pipe might
make trucking the cheaper option, as shown in Figure 6.12.
Pipeline use might be complicated by weather, though; a pipeline transferring
water might freeze. Moreover, using a pipeline involves acquiring permission to lay
pipe along land that might not be owned by the operator seeking water. In this
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analysis, it is assumed that pipelines can access the public right-of-way (as per Texas
Senate Bill 514), along the same stretch of road that a truck would use to transport
water.
Sensitivity Analysis of Water Transfer Costs
Because water transfer costs can vary, a sensitivity analysis was conducted and
is shown in Figure 6.13. A change in speed of 10 mph (to 20 mph instead of 30 mph,
signifying higher traffic) would increase price by $5-10 thousand per well, depending
on the scenario. A change in trucking rate of $5 per hour could change price by about
$5 thousand. A change in wait time of 5 minutes (from 5 to 10 or 10 to 15 minute
wait time for traffic, loading, and unloading) results in a change in cost of about $40
thousand. Meaning, reducing truck transfer times requires reducing wait times by
making loading and unloading of trucks more efficient. If wait times are known to be
long, lay-flat pipe is the cheaper option in under short-term multi-day contracts, but
gets expensive under longer-term contracts.
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Figure 6.13: The sensitivity analysis for water transfer for each scenario shows vari-
ations in trucking cost, load time, and speed.
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Comparing Costs Across Scenarios
Groundwater prices are reported by Cook and Webber 2016 [171]. However,
those prices were collected at a high oil price. Under a lower oil price scenario, water
prices will decrease. In this analysis, it is assumed that the low oil price scenario
would result in a water price half that of the high oil price scenario. We evaluate
groundwater at the low end of prices estimated by this 2016 study. Based on field
estimates, brackish water is slightly less expensive than fresh groundwater. Price of
using treated FP water is estimated from Barnes et al. 2015 [207] as a percent of
fresh groundwater price.
Water acquisition, including purchase and transfer, becomes expensive as more
water is used. Lowering this price is important for water users. Figure 6.14 shows
water acquisition costs for each of the six scenarios. Table 6.1 includes the average
and median costs for those scenarios. In this analysis, a transition toward alternative
water sources in a market framework that incentivizes use of FP water (reducing
fresh groundwater use from 100% to 30%) would see a change in cost of about $40
thousand per well on average as shown in Figure 6.14. Water acquisition costs are
minimized in this analysis and thus, the range shown in the figure will be lower than
the actual costs experienced in the field.
6.4.3 Reducing Potential Third Party Effects: Over-extraction of Fresh
Groundwater
Groundwater in Texas is not allocated by any entity. However, the desired fu-
ture conditions for the aquifer are evaluated and a modeled available groundwater is
determined as discussed in Section 3.2.3.3. As a result of this planning process, mod-
eled available groundwater is attributed to counties, as shown in Figure 6.15. Using
the modeled available groundwater per county, this work then assigns a proportional
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Figure 6.14: The variation of source water acquisition costs for all wells is reported
for each scenario of the location-allocation network analysis. Water acquisition costs
are minimized in this analysis and will be lower than actual costs experienced.
Table 6.1: Average and median source water acquisition costs per well are reported
for each scenario of the location-allocation network analysis. Water acquisition costs
are minimized in this analysis and will be lower than actual costs experienced.
GW GW/BW/Eff BW BW/FP FP All
Sources
Average $177,000 $169,000 $164,000 $125,000 $123,000 $122,000
Median $182,000 $176,000 $174,000 $123,000 $123,000 $123,000
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allotment to groundwater wells in each county, as shown in Figure 6.16.
The amount of groundwater allocated in the network analysis is then evaluated
against the capacity assigned to a well to determine if groundwater is over-extracted
compared to the MAG. Excessive extraction at a rate beyond that which the aquifer
is refilled is considered groundwater mining. The aquifers in West Texas have been
mined of their groundwater in the past and are still at risk of groundwater min-
ing. Proportional over-extraction could lead to draw-down in certain areas of the
aquifer that might be at risk of groundwater mining. Figures 6.17, 6.18, and 6.19
show the amount of potential over-extraction compared to the MAG at wells in the
network analysis. As shown in the figures, the southern portion of the Spraberry
trend experiences the most water use and the most over-extraction of groundwater
resources. Using alternative water sources, as shown in Figures 6.18 and 6.19, reduces
the singular instances of over-extraction and the collection of multiple instances of
over-extraction into hot spots that could lead to groundwater mining. The location-
allocation analysis chooses optimal groundwater wells for supply in each scenario (less
when more alternative sources are available). However, in practice, the same wells
might not experience the assigned withdrawals. Instead, similar nearby wells might
provide groundwater. The existence of many wells extracting more than their share
of water in the same area could cause draw-down in nearby wells and, on a grand
scale, in regional aquifer levels. The actual level of draw-down is not measured in
this analysis. However, viewing the general number of wells in an area exceeding the
proportional modeled available groundwater, as well as the reduction of that count for
alternative scenarios, gives an understanding of the impact on groundwater resources.
Use of only alternative water sources would eliminate the associated over-extraction
of groundwater (as no groundwater would be used).
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Figure 6.15: The figure shows modeled available groundwater per county in billion
gallons collected and reported by TWDB [29–35]
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Figure 6.16: The figure shows reported modeled available groundwater per county
allocated to wells producing water from aquifers in the county.
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Figure 6.17: The figure shows potential over-extraction at groundwater wells for the
scenario of fresh groundwater only (GW). Most groundwater over-extraction occurs
in the southern portion of the Spraberry trend.
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Figure 6.18: The figure shows potential over-extraction at groundwater wells the
scenario of fresh and brackish groundwater (GW/BW). Less water is over-extracted
under this scenario than under the groundwater only (GW) scenario.
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Figure 6.19: The figure shows potential over-extraction at groundwater wells for the
scenario of a combination of fresh and brackish water and flowback and produced
water (GW/BW/FP). As more alternative resources compete, less groundwater is
used and less groundwater is proportionately over-extracted.
131
6.4.3.1 Feasibility of a Centralized FP Treatment System
Feasibility of using disposal wells from different companies work together might
be questionable. This model makes the case for linking multiple receiving nodes to
treatment systems. An operator or multiple operators with a sizeable footprint would
be able to set up such a system. It is important to note that the larger the scale, the
more collaboration potentially required between operators in water and cost sharing.
Transition costs are associated with building the plant and developing wa-
ter sharing plans. The general lack of cooperation between companies on existing
water sharing agreements shows that transition costs, though currently unmeasured
are high. If the governing entity (in this case, the State of Texas or groundwater
conservation districts at the regional level) would like to incentivize water sharing
agreements for alternative water sources and construction of treatment plants, policy
choices, such as increased fees on fresh groundwater or disposal or tax reductions
associated with use of FP water, could help overcome transition costs.
Transaction costs are associated with transferring the water and mitigating
leaks or spills in untreated or treated FP water. However, reducing groundwater
extraction reduces third party effects and any costs that might have been applied to
compensate those third parties.
6.5 Discussion
Of the four research questions laid out in Chapter 1, questions 1, 3, and 4 were
explored in this chapter in the context of the Spraberry formation in the Permian
Basin in West Texas. To summarize, (1) there are options available to reduce fresh
water use in the Permian Basin, (3) a network of available treated flowback and
produced water could economically supply oil and gas sector water demands, and (4)
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low cost alternative water resources could be supplied economically, offsetting billions
of gallons of fresh groundwater demand for oil and gas operations.
In this analysis, six scenarios are analyzed to assess competition between water
source types. Results show that use of non-fresh water resources could offset 9 billion
gallons of water in the Spraberry formation (enough fresh water to supply the annual
residential demand for 240 thousand people) at a cost lower than the price currently
paid for fresh water. Costs for FP water treatment include capital and operations
expenses. However, because transaction costs are not evaluated in this work, it is
possible that current costs might be too high for many companies due to negotia-
tions between various stakeholders (operators, service companies, and landowners).
It should also be noted that this model includes one year of data and no forecasting
of drilling plans. A decision-making process at the operator level could include more
years of data and proprietary drilling forecasts.
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Chapter 7
Discussion
7.1 Results of the Integrated, Geographically Resolved Hy-
drologic Process
The main aim of the work presented in this dissertation is to augment the ex-
isting literature by developing a process for evaluating water savings potential through
incorporating existing methods, management, and technologies into an original water
and cost model. Methods are integrated in an environment of previously unseen high
marginal prices associated with energy extraction for three case studies in the Lower
Rio Grande Basin, the Brazos River Basin, and the Permian Basin in Texas.
This work explores four research questions:
1. can reductions in fresh water consumption accomplished through improved wa-
ter management make significant volumes of water available for other purposes,
2. which water use sectors (agriculture, municipal, or thermoelectric power) are
best suited to conserve water with the intent to sell to other users,
3. could a network of available treated flowback and produced water economically
supply oil and gas sector water demands, and
4. if the energy sector or other high-value water use sector makes cross-sectoral or
intra-sectoral investments in fresh-water-lean systems, can their water demands
be fulfilled at a cost offset by the price paid for that water?
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Results vary, but in general, (1) there are options available to reduce fresh
water use in each basin, (2) the low cost conservation options are in the agriculture
and sometimes the municipal sectors, (3) the oil and gas sector could reduce its own
fresh water use through flowback and produced water treatment, especially where
wastewater volumes are significant compared to water demands, and (4) if the energy
sector paid for water, the low-cost fresh water reduction methods available could
be implemented economically and offset much of the water demand for oil and gas
activity.
For example, in the Rio Grande Basin, results show that up to 900 million
gallons per year could be made available through 15% conservation in watermaster
area irrigation districts, enough to provide about 30% of the 3 billion gallons of water
demanded per year in 2016 and 2017 for hydraulically fractured wells. In the Brazos
River Basin, results show that agricultural and municipal users could increase profits
by conserving consumptive uses and selling to oil and gas operations, and low cost
conservation scenarios in the basin could provide up to 4.1 billion gallons of water
per year. Finally, in the Permian Basin, results show that competition between all
users that relies heavily on recycled FP water could offset 9 billion gallons of fresh or
brackish water, that could be used for other purposes or remain in the aquifers. While
hundreds of million to billions of gallons of water might not be significant for irrigation
districts or municipalities, the volume is enough to provide a significant proportion of
oil and gas water demands in each region. For each case, it is important to consider
third party effects on reliability, resilience, and vulnerability of water supplies, as
the water trade might benefit all direct users but have indirect impacts on water
provided to other users. Similarly, existing conditions might have third party effects
that are currently un-addressed but would be mitigated under a water trade. System
evaluation of these changes would benefit all users and grant the opportunity to
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mitigate associated concerns.
7.2 Policy Considerations
The results presented in this dissertation illustrate some of the tradeoffs as-
sociated with water trading to achieve reallocation of resources without increasing
fresh water consumption. To conduct this analysis in another basin, the modeler
should first evaluate the functionality of the existent policy framework, any potential
changes needed to encourage market activity, and whether those changes are feasible.
Chapter 2 discusses water policy and basic principles of water markets. Here, some
specific concerns are highlighted to emphasize their importance to the integrated,
geographically-resolved hydrologic process and the case studies discussed within this
dissertation.
Legacy Allocations and Price
Legacy allocations of water that give users rights to withdraw without paying
for water give little incentive for users to conserve a supply to which they are essen-
tially entitled. Similarly, ownership without a volume allocation gives little incentive
to conserve as supply is virtually limitless for the user and, if they were to conserve
a shared resource like water, another user would simply use the resource instead.
Capacity of Allocations
Setting capacities or permits to withdrawal as well as reasonable prices for
water allows users to make judgments associated with their water use that incorporate
the scarcity of the resource, the value of its current use, and the value of its sale for
another use. For example, in the Rio Grande in Texas, water is more valuable when
allotted to oil and gas activities than it is when allotted to irrigate certain types of
agriculture because the market value of the final product is much higher. However,
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the impetus to sell water to oil and gas activities is not quite clear when water for
agriculture is allocated and either inexpensive or free and water for oil and gas requires
negotiation for trade.
Transparency in the Market
Water allocation policy in a system with the intent to encourage market trad-
ing should aim for transparency. In an active, transparent market with a water
arbiter, surplus supplies available for trade, as well as prices of previous trades are
determinable. Similarly, the potential to pay for increased surplus supplies could
be made clear within this system, as well. In a less active environment with no
transparency, finding surplus water would be difficult, posing a strong barrier to any
potential trade and increasing associated costs. In addition, in each case, there are
negotiation costs associated with ensuring that conservation occurs, the methods un-
dertaken, and the payments required.
Policy Change
Where policies are not aligned to encourage markets but there is a desire to
change, decision-making tools such as the process presented in this work could guide
policy development by showing the benefits of price-induced water reduction under
certain policy scenarios. As water resources become increasingly strained over time,
understanding the available combinations of solutions could help inform the develop-
ment and implementation of sustainable policy that encourages those solutions.
Encouraging Participation
Encouraging water users to participate in a water market to offset fresh water
increases is a challenge. Encouraging conservation as a part of that participation
adds additional difficulty. Market participation might be encouraged from multiple
perspectives. For example, irrigators might wish to conserve but lack financial ability.
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A market would provide that financial incentive to conserve and trade that surplus
water. As an alternative, the water buyer might wish to encourage conservation. An
oil and gas operator or set of operators might decide that public opinion warrants
a campaign for net zero water use. One instance of such a campaign is that of
Southwestern Energy operating in the Fayetteville Shale in Arkansas. The company
mitigates the impacts of its hydraulic fracturing operations on the environment by
rehabilitating lost wetlands or creating a new habitat in Arkansas [188]. In another
instance of the buyer inducing changes in water management, in 2007, engineers for
the City of Roma in Starr County decided to use grant funds they were awarded for
water rights to instead make improvements to irrigation canal conveyance efficiency
in Cameron County, Texas in exchange for excess water rights [158]. The trade
provided necessary demands and resulted in excess savings. A third alternative of
encouraging savings might come from the regulator in an attempt to ensure supplies
are available for all demands. Incentives could be employed to encourage conservation
decisions by the irrigator or operators. For example, capacity constraints could be
implemented where they do not exist; subsidies, grants, or other forms of monetary
encouragement could be attached to conservation plans; or taxes or tradable permits
could be imposed on total water use. While this work does not go into detail about
the potential incentives needed to encourage conservation and market participation,
Section 8.2 describes the need to study the application of these options within the
future work of the integrated, geographically resolved hydrologic process described in
this dissertation.
7.3 Participant and Conservation Method Considerations
Model results for the Rio Grande and Brazos simulations show that there are
options to reduce fresh water consumption through water conservation best manage-
138
ment practices at costs offset by the price currently paid for water, specifically certain
agriculture and municipal conservation methods. Focusing on these low-cost options
to save water could be a goal for states or regions wanting to reduce fresh water
consumption in an effort to reduce water stress. However, as noted in the previous
chapters, it is important to address third party concerns associated with individual
reductions in reliability (adequately meeting demand) and resilience (meeting demand
after a shortage) of water supplies.
The goal of efficient conservation is to ensure that water use is reduced while
production is able to continue at existent levels. If users conserve, but continue to
operate at their current levels of productivity, and sell saved water, the total benefit
to the user exceeds either option of not selling water to maintain operations or selling
water but forgoing operations. For example, agricultural irrigators could (1) continue
to farm at their current levels of productivity; (2) sell water and forgo farming as
well as the income associated with that farming; or (3) conserve water to a point that
does not damage their productivity, maintain their current levels of farming, and sell
the new surplus associated with saving water. As another example, municipal water
providers could (1) continue to provide water at their current levels of use; (2) reduce
water use within their capacity (potentially for public areas) to benefit from selling
water; or (3) reduce system water loss or increase system conservation, maintain cur-
rent levels of customer satisfaction from water use, and sell the new surplus associated
with saving water. In a market environment, the low cost agriculture and municipal
water savings options become an economic choice for new users able to pay for that
water at a benefit to the original user.
This work highlights best management practices (BMPs) that result in a bene-
fit to the agriculture or municipal water user. Potential irrigation conservation oppor-
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tunities that could benefit the irrigators are use of furrow dikes, which are small dams
for each ridge between a planted row of crops; gated and flexible pipe to prevent seep-
age in irrigation channels and furrows; drip irrigation; center pivot sprinklers; surge
flow; and brush management. Tailwater recovery and land leveling are more expen-
sive methods that are sometimes offset by the price of water but not at a benefit to
the irrigator over simply selling their water. Potential municipal conservation and
efficiency opportunities included in this work that could benefit the municipality are
reducing water losses, reducing turfgrass water use for public landscapes, or imple-
menting rebate programs for home appliances. The cost of cash-for-grass programs
that pay homeowners to replace their grass with Xeriscaping could be offset by the
price of water but not at a benefit to the municipality over simply selling their water.
A cash-for-grass program might still be valuable at the municipal level given other
additional financing, though, if the end result meant less turfgrass demanding water
in future decades. As another example, treating flowback and produced water (FP)
at a network level could reduce total water costs for oil and gas operators and reduce
total fresh water consumption. Conversely, neither selling water that would have
been used to generate electricity nor switching cooling technologies to hybrid or dry
cooling would be economic for the power company under current water and power
prices. Finally, as noted in Chapter 2, improving system dynamics without the users
intent to reduce water use does not reduce water use. Thus, those intending to trade
saved water should ensure water users mindset is shifted to a low water use scenario.
Generally, cost is a major hurdle in implementing BMPs for water use in both
the agriculture and municipal sectors. For example, as noted in Chapter 2, where
cost of water is a small percent of total farm budget, investment is slow and capital
for long-term investment in irrigation efficiency might not always be available. A
major benefit of market-induced conservation is that payment for BMPs is part of
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the transaction, removing this particular hurdle. In addition, finances are not the only
hurdle to BMP implementation. Education about BMPs (and newer technologies in
general) leads to more adoption even under non-market conditions. More available
BMP training within a market environment, including potential to trial new methods,
would reduce both cost and education hurdles.
7.4 Hydrologic Model Choice Considerations
Chapter 3 discusses the considerations to address when choosing models and
acquiring necessary data. It is sometimes possible to use an existing model that is
already calibrated to the hydrologic conditions of the basin as well as the demands
and discharges of water users and is employed within the basin for planning purposes,
research, or both as with the studies in the Rio Grande and Brazos basins conducted
in this work. Such a model is the best case scenario but not always available.
Instead, it might be necessary to develop an allocation model if one is not
available. In such a case, it is important to choose a format that incorporates the
necessary water supply, demand, and policy inputs. For example, WEAP, used in
this work to evaluate the Rio Grande, is able to incorporate international treaties,
allocations from user groups, and interconnections between surface and groundwater.
It is also important to ensure that the period of analysis covered by the model is
sufficient for decision-making.
The WEAP model for the Rio Grande includes 60 years of data. In another
example in this work, the analysis for the Permian Basin in West Texas, the model
of allocations between users was built specifically for that study and follows the
road network traversed by water users in that area, but the model is a one-year
approximation of current conditions. It is not built for nor should it be used for
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long-term planning in the region. However, the model is useful to evaluate semi-
permanent solutions to water stress concerns in the near future. Ensuring the model
choice incorporates the existing hydrologic conditions, the allocation data (supply,
demand, and policy inputs), and an appropriate time period will lead to a robust
backdrop for decision-making.
Uncertainty in Hydrologic Models
Chapter 3 discusses the error inherent in modeling water supplies. While ap-
proximations of error are not actually included in results reported in this analysis, it is
important to understand that results are not exact. The WEAP, WAM, and Location-
Allocation models used for regional analysis in this work carry their own technical
errors associated with approximating flows, water allocations, and discharges. Op-
timizations, for example, are ideal, sometimes unrealistic approximations of actual
activities. The inherent imperfection of model results underscores the need to reduce
the error incorporated in the results by ensuring that aspects that are controllable
(the data inputs, model choice, and period of study) are high quality.
In addition, each of the water models used in this work incorporates some
aspect of human activity, which is generally unpredictable. For example, the model
of water allocations in the Permian Basin assumes truck drivers transporting water
will seek out the nearest source of water or wastewater disposal on the shortest path.
In practice, drivers might choose a different water source, disposal well, or path for
a number of reasons (for instance, the wastewater well is more convenient for their
drive home) leading to non-optimal results for the oil and gas operator paying for
truck transport. A good model could highlight the human error and make areas for
improvement more apparent and potentially easier to address.
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7.5 General Considerations
This work presents a process for evaluating water savings potential through
incorporating existing methods, management, and technologies. To conduct such an
analysis in another basin, water modelers should identify relevant policies, water users,
and models. Agriculture conservation and flowback and produced water treatment for
reuse in the oilfield are the low cost options identified in this analysis and might be the
best water saving options for reallocation in other basins, as well. If hydrologic models
need to be created, this work gives some direction for model design. In addition, if
policy changes are needed, the process can be used to assess their usefulness in a
market environment.
Although this methodology was applied to regions in Texas, the approach
is applicable for other areas encountering or expecting additional water stress. As
populations grow and demand more water, water resources are subject to stress and
management challenges. Creating tools, such as this process can assist integrated
function of water policy, technology, and economics to address water scarcity, now
and in the future.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
The aim of the work presented in this dissertation is to augment the existing
literature through the development of an integrated, geographically resolved hydro-
logic process for evaluating potential water savings and reallocation within a market
environment. The Texas water market, like other water markets around the world,
has historically been dominated by transactions within the agriculture sector and
transactions between the agriculture and municipal sectors in local markets around
the state. However, with the growth of unconventional oil and gas production, the
market experienced an increase in demand for high-value water by the energy in-
dustry. The associated increased water price opens up the possibility for innovation
and investments in management practices for water use efficiency in various sectors,
spurring lasting changes in fresh water consumption in each basin. How regions have
responded and continue to respond will affect future water supplies. Reduction in
fresh water use through conservation of consumed unproductive water and use of al-
ternative water sources is one option for meeting water needs. Incentives made clear
through water markets could help finance investments in water fresh water reduction
and link savings to new demands.
8.1 Summary of Results
This work lays out the methodology of evaluating water savings potential with
an original water and cost model that is developed and demonstrated for three case
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studies in the Lower Rio Grande Basin, the Brazos River Basin, and the Permian
Basin in Texas. The analysis adds to the existing literature by incorporating pricing,
costs, water supply and allocations, and technological and management advances
in an environment of previously unseen high marginal prices associated with energy
extraction. Because water supplies around the world are expected to increase in stress
in the future, it is important to analyze the effect of new, high paying users and the
ability of regions to react in ways that preserve supplies for current and future users
within existing policy frameworks.
By implementing a combination of improved conservation, efficiency, and man-
agement mechanisms, current water users and their economic partners (for example,
oil and gas companies) could optimize their water use and achieve more water avail-
ability for themselves and/or the environment. In a partnership, this increased water
availability would augment the ability to hydraulically fracture more wells, for exam-
ple, and maintain the same amount of productivity in the original water sector, while
possibly increasing environmental flows. In the ideal situation, this water market
could solve water needs for multiple industries, result in more water for ecosystems,
and create a more water resource-friendly environment in the process.
Results vary, but generally, water can be saved in a market environment at a
price paid by high value water users. The water saved in the study areas analyzed
within this document could provide a significant proportion of oil and gas water
needs. The low cost options are agriculture conservation, treatment of flowback and
produced water for reuse in oil and gas operations, and some municipal water loss
reduction or conservation. While thermoelectric power and turfgrass are significant
water users In Texas, the value associated with that water use generally exceeds the
ability to pay for conservation strategies in a water market. Attention should be paid
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to low cost options and remedying third party impacts such as reductions in reliability
and resilience or increases in vulnerability associated with those trades.
In the Rio Grande Basin, scenarios are analyzed for trading irrigation savings
for use by oil and gas operations. Results show that up to 900 million gallons per
year could be made available through 15% conservation in watermaster area irrigation
districts at a cost much lower than the price paid for water used in oil and gas
operations. The savings are enough to provide about 30% of the 3 billion gallons of
water demanded per year in 2016 and 2017 for hydraulically fractured wells. Irrigation
districts would increase profit and experience an increase in reliability of their supply.
Moreover, use of saved fresh surface water rather than fresh groundwater for oil and
gas operations leaves slower-to-replenish groundwater in place, a positive effect on
third parties in the area.
In the Brazos Basin, scenarios are analyzed for trading water savings from
irrigation, municipal, and thermoelectric power for use by oil and gas operations.
Results show that scenarios could provide up to 4.1 billion gallons of water per year,
depending on the user and conservation method. However, costs of conservation
vary. Generally, irrigation conservation methods are the least cost choice, followed by
municipal conservation, and then water conservation in thermoelectric power. Under
water trading scenarios, agricultural and municipal users could increase profits by con-
serving consumptive uses and selling to oil and gas operations. However, third party
users might experience positive or negative changes in their reliability and resilience.
Capturing these effects is important to addressing externalities. Additionally, as in
the Rio Grande Basin, use of saved fresh surface water rather than fresh groundwater
leaves groundwater in place, a positive effect on third parties in the area.
In the Permian Basin in West Texas, six scenarios are analyzed to assess
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competition between water source types. Results show that competition between all
users that relies heavily on recycled FP water could save operators money and offset
9 billion gallons of water (enough water to supply the annual residential demand for
240 thousand people1). However, it is possible that current transition costs might be
too high for many companies.
To conduct such an analysis in another basin, consideration should be given to
existing policy structure, water users’ potential to conserve, and availability of existing
models and data. In evaluating policy choices, the modeler should analyze the efficacy
of the current policy framework and the feasibility of implementing changes when
needed. In considering users’ potential to conserve, it is possible that the low cost
options in Texas will also be the low cost options in other areas. Therefore, cross-
sectoral participant analysis should focus on agriculture users and some municipal
users, followed by intra-sectoral focus on reducing consumptive use, for example,
through recycling contaminated water. Finally, in choosing a model to assess the effect
of trades between users in the current or altered policy environment, the modeler must
aim to include existing hydrologic conditions, allocation data, a time period adequate
for decision-making, and uncertainty.
8.2 Future Work
Future work should include better estimation of transaction costs and meth-
ods for reducing those costs that could be the main barrier to reallocation of saved
water. Rio Grande basin transaction costs are similar to those seen in other basins
(about 21% compared to 8–34% in other basins [166–170]). However, calculation of
1The City of Midland’s residential consumption was reported at 102 gallons per capita per day
in 2016 [193].
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transaction costs was not exhaustive of all potential costs that exist and thus could be
higher than the estimated amount. Moreover, the Rio Grande market is thought to
be a relatively efficient market compared to the less active groundwater and surface
water markets in other parts of the state. Meaning, the unquantified transaction costs
in the Brazos Basin and the Permian Basin could be much larger than the 21% seen
in the Rio Grande Basin. Quantifying and reducing these costs should be a priority
before engaging in large-scale water trading in either basin.
A water market with incentives to encourage consumptive water use reduction
strategies is one policy tool of many and can be used in tandem with others or in
place of less economically efficient policies. Future work should include policy analyses
aimed at determining gradual, iterative reforms that could improve market efficiency
in the varied water management systems included in this analysis or in other sys-
tems that might experience an influx of high-priced demand. In the Murray-Darling
Basin in Australia, iterative reforms, including informal trading, diversion limits, wa-
ter rights reform, and adaptation, took hold over three decades [168]. To take full
advantage of improving water supplies, regions could streamline their regulated wa-
ter markets and incorporate basin-, region-, or state-wide incentives that promote
consumptive water reductions in favor of supplying other beneficial uses including oil
and gas activity or environmental flows.
In addition, estimations of the uncertainty in the hydrologic models should be
included in future use of the integrated, geographically-resolved hydrologic process.
Uncertainty is inherent in the technical and human aspects of the model, as well as
water conservation, allocation, and use. Discussion of the impact of uncertainty is
included in Chapters 3 and 7, but estimates are not included. The accuracy of the
integrated process would be improved with inclusion of uncertainty.
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Finally, site-specific engineering analyses are needed to actually implement
water consumption reductions properly. Each entity participating in a saved water
market should conduct its own water audit to ensure that the saved volume esti-
mated in this work is “real water” rather than “paper water” as described in Chapter
2. It is also important to note that while best management practices analyzed in this
work might save water, water users might be unwilling to implement them. Many
factors affect adoption of water efficiency mechanisms, particularly water price and
finances, education, policy, and water availability. Partnership with oil and gas com-
panies could eliminate the financial hurdle. However, it is also important to ensure
water users are educated, policies are favorable, and water availability concerns are
managed.
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Appendix A
Interest Rates and Terms
Because systems have different lengths of effect, before comparing costs be-
tween systems, we assess the net present value, NPV , and recurring yearly payment,
Rt, of each system so comparisons can be made on equivalent values. Calculation of
NPV and Rt are included in Chapter 3. The discount rate is the rate that could
be earned on an investment and is assumed to be the market interest rate for agri-
cultural loans as reported by TWDB, 3.15% [22]. Examples of the cost of irrigation
and municipal conservation varied by common payment periods and interest rates
reported by TWDB are shown in Chapter 3. Additional example figures are included
here in Figures A.2 and A.1.
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Figure A.1: The capital cost of municipal water conservation reported by TWDB [21]
is shown using interest rates and loan lengths offered by TWDB or the market and
reported by TWDB [22].
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Figure A.2: The capital cost of municipal water loss reduction and control reported
by TWDB [21] is shown using interest rates and loan lengths offered by TWDB or
the market and reported by TWDB [22].
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Appendix B
Reliability, Resilience, and Vulnerability for
Trades on the Rio Grande
B.1 Reliability
Figure B.1 displays the reliability of water supplied to oil and gas operators
for each of the water saving scenarios: 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% from each of the
watermaster sections saving water. As Figure B.1 shows, reliability is unchanged
across scenarios at approximately 60–62%, depending on the watermaster section
providing saved water.
Figure 4.5 in Chapter 4 shows reliability of water supplied to irrigators in
watermaster sections after saving water under each scenario: 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15%
water savings. Reliability for all irrigation sections is shown to increase from baseline
in all scenarios of conservation and trade.
B.2 Resilience
Figure B.2 displays the resilience of water supplied to irrigators in watermaster
sections after saving water under each scenario: 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% water savings.
For most watermaster groups, resilience improves under increasing conservation levels.
For one watermaster section, 13A, resilience decreases from baseline, but increases
for increasing conservation levels.
Figure B.3 displays the resilience of water supplied to oil and gas operators
for each of the water saving scenarios: 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% from each of the
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Figure B.1: Reliability for oil and gas operators following trades of varying amounts
of saved water, shown by watermaster group.
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Figure B.2: Resilience for irrigators following trades of varying amounts of saved
water, shown by watermaster group.
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Figure B.3: Resilience for oil and gas operators following trades of varying amounts
of saved water, shown by watermaster group.
watermaster sections saving water. Resilience is constant across scenarios at approx-
imately 4%. This low resilience indicates a general inability to recover from drought
in consecutive years.
B.3 Vulnerability
Figure B.4 displays the vulnerability of water supplied to irrigators in water-
master sections after saving water under each scenario: 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% water
savings. Vulnerability for irrigators saving water is low, varying between 0.04% and
0.12% depending on the watermaster section.
Figure B.5 displays the vulnerability of water supplied to oil and gas operators
for each of the water saving scenarios: 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% from each of the
157
Figure B.4: Vulnerability for irrigators following trades of varying amounts of saved
water, shown by watermaster group.
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Figure B.5: vulnerability for oil and gas operators following trades of varying amounts
of saved water, shown by watermaster group.
watermaster sections saving water. Vulnerability for oil and gas operators receiving
saved water is low, decreasing as water conservation increases.
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Appendix C
Reliability, Resilience, and Vulnerability for
Trades on the Brazos
C.1 Reliability
Figures in this section display the effects of water trading scenarios on relia-
bility for users throughout the Brazos Basin. Figures C.1 and C.2 show reliability for
agriculture case 1 and 2, respectively. Figures C.3, 5.6, and C.4 show reliability for
municipal cases 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Figures C.5, C.7, C.9, C.11, and C.13 show
results for thermoelectric power hybrid cooling cases. Figures C.6, C.8, C.10, C.12,
and C.14 show results for thermoelectric power dry cooling cases.
Reliability is measured as the frequency of a system to receive its full demand
(frequency of non-deficit periods). The figures show a change reliability for individual
users in the basin. Some of the cases shown have minimal third party effects (for
example, Figure C.12). Some cases affect many users, but most effects are beneficial
(for example, Figure C.2). Conversely, some cases affect many users negatively (for
example, C.6). It is important to determine individual changes in reliability (third
party effects) in response to a reallocation of water in a trade to be able to mitigate
them at the watermaster level.
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Figure C.1: After trading for saved water under Agriculture Case 1, many users
benefit from improved reliability and some users experience reduced reliability. All
decreases in reliability are under 15% compared to the baseline.
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Figure C.2: After trading for saved water under Agriculture Case 2, many users
benefit from improved reliability and one user experiences reduced reliability. All
decreases in reliability are under 15% compared to the baseline.
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Figure C.3: After trading for saved water under Municipal Case 1, many users benefit
from improved reliability. All decreases in reliability are under 15% compared to the
baseline.
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Figure C.4: After trading for saved water under Municipal Case 3, many users benefit
from improved reliability and one user experiences reduced reliability. Changes in
reliability are under 15% compared to the baseline.
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Figure C.5: After trading for saved water under a Hybrid Cooling Scenario for Power
Plants 1–3, some users benefit from improved reliability and some users experience
reduced reliability. Changes in reliability are under 15% compared to the baseline.
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Figure C.6: After trading for saved water under a Dry Cooling Scenario for Power
Plants 1–3, some users benefit from improved reliability and many users experience
reduced reliability. Changes in reliability are under 15% compared to the baseline.
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Figure C.7: After trading for saved water under a Hybrid Cooling Scenario for Power
Plant 4, some users benefit from improved reliability. Increases in reliability are under
15% compared to the baseline.
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Figure C.8: After trading for saved water under a Dry Cooling Scenario for Power
Plant 4, some users benefit from improved reliability. Increases in reliability are under
15% compared to the baseline.
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Figure C.9: After trading for saved water under a Hybrid Cooling Scenario for Power
Plant 5, some users benefit from improved reliability and one user experiences reduced
reliability. The decrease in reliability is under 15% compared to the baseline.
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Figure C.10: After trading for saved water under a Dry Cooling Scenario for Power
Plant 5, some users benefit from improved reliability and one user experiences reduced
reliability. The decrease in reliability is under 15% compared to the baseline.
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Figure C.11: After trading for saved water under a Hybrid Cooling Scenario for
Power Plant 6, one user benefits from improved reliability above 15% compared to
the baseline.
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Figure C.12: After trading for saved water under a Dry Cooling Scenario for Power
Plant 6, one user benefits from improved reliability above 15% compared to the
baseline.
172
Figure C.13: After trading for saved water under a Dry Cooling Scenario for Power
Plant 7, some users benefit from improved reliability and one user experiences reduced
reliability. The decrease in reliability is under 15% compared to the baseline.
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Figure C.14: After trading for saved water under a Dry Cooling Scenario for Power
Plant 7, some users benefit from improved reliability and some users experience re-
duced reliability. Decreases in reliability are under 15% compared to the baseline.
174
C.2 Resilience
Figures in this section display the effects of water trading scenarios on resilience
for users throughout the Brazos Basin. Figures C.15 and C.16 show resilience for
agriculture case 1 and 2, respectively. Figures C.17, 5.7, and C.18 show resilience for
municipal cases 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Figures C.19, C.21, C.23, C.25, and C.27
show results for thermoelectric power hybrid cooling cases. Figures C.20, C.22, C.24,
C.26, and C.28 show results for thermoelectric power dry cooling cases. Scenarios not
shown experienced no change in resilience compared to the baseline.
Resilience is measured as the ability to recover after a deficit. The figures show
a change in the ability to recover from deficit for individual users in the basin. Some
of the cases shown have minimal effects on resilience (for example, Figure C.26).
Some cases affect many users, but most effects are beneficial (for example, Figure
C.15). Conversely, some cases affect many users negatively (for example, C.17). It
is important to determine individual changes in ability to recover from deficit in
response to a reallocation of water in a trade to be able to mitigate them at the
watermaster level, if possible.
C.3 Vulnerability
Figures in this section display the effects of water trading scenarios on vulner-
ability for users throughout the Brazos Basin. Figures C.29 and C.30 show vulner-
ability for agriculture case 1 and 2, respectively. Figures C.31, 5.8, and C.32 show
vulnerability for municipal cases 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Figures C.33, C.34, and
C.35, show results for thermoelectric power dry cooling cases. Scenarios not shown
experience no change in vulnerability.
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Figure C.15: After trading for saved water under Agriculture Case 1, many users ben-
efit from improved resilience and some users experience reduced resilience. Two users
experience large reductions in resilience (more than 15% compared to the baseline).
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Figure C.16: After trading for saved water under Agriculture Case 2, many users
benefit from improved resilience and some users experience reduced resilience. One
user experiences a large reduction in resilience (more than 15% compared to the
baseline).
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Figure C.17: After trading for saved water under Municipal Case 1, many users
benefit from improved resilience and some users experience reduced resilience. One
user experiences a large reduction in resilience (more than 15% compared to the
baseline).
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Figure C.18: After trading for saved water under Municipal Case 3, many users
benefit from improved resilience and some users experience reduced resilience. One
user experiences a large reduction in resilience (more than 15% compared to the
baseline).
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Figure C.19: After trading for saved water under a Hybrid Cooling Scenario for Power
Plants 1–3, many users benefit from improved resilience and some users experience
reduced resilience. Changes in resilience are under 15% compared to the baseline.
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Figure C.20: After trading for saved water under a Dry Cooling Scenario for Power
Plants 1–3, many users benefit from improved resilience and some users experience
reduced resilience. One user experiences a large reduction in resilience (more than
15% compared to the baseline).
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Figure C.21: After trading for saved water under a Hybrid Cooling Scenario for Power
Plants 4, some users benefit from improved resilience and some users experience
reduced resilience. Changes in resilience are under 15% compared to the baseline.
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Figure C.22: After trading for saved water under a Dry Cooling Scenario for Power
Plants 4, some users benefit from improved resilience and some users experience
reduced resilience. Changes in resilience are under 15% compared to the baseline.
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Figure C.23: After trading for saved water under a Hybrid Cooling Scenario for
Power Plants 5, no users benefit from improved resilience and some users experience
reduced resilience. Two users experiences a large reduction in resilience (more than
15% compared to the baseline).
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Figure C.24: After trading for saved water under a Dry Cooling Scenario for Power
Plants 5, one user benefits from improved resilience and some users experience re-
duced resilience. One user experiences a large reduction in resilience (more than 15%
compared to the baseline).
185
Figure C.25: After trading for saved water under a Hybrid Cooling Scenario for Power
Plants 6, most users’ resilience is unaffected. One user experiences a small reduction
in resilience.
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Figure C.26: After trading for saved water under a Hybrid Cooling Scenario for
Power Plants 6, most users’ resilience is unaffected. One user experiences an increase
in resilience.
187
Figure C.27: After trading for saved water under a Dry Cooling Scenario for Power
Plants 5, one user benefits from improved resilience and some users experience reduced
resilience. Changes in resilience are under 15% compared to the baseline.
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Figure C.28: After trading for saved water under a Dry Cooling Scenario for Power
Plants 5, some users benefits from improved resilience and some users experience
reduced resilience. One user experiences a large reduction in resilience (over 15%
compared to the baseline).
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Vulnerability is measured as the average magnitude of deficits over the entire
analysis period. The figures show a change in average deficit for individual users
in the basin. Some of the cases shown have minimal effects on vulnerability (for
example, Figure C.31). Some cases affect many users, but most effects are beneficial
(for example, Figure C.29). Conversely, some cases affect one or more users negatively
(for example, C.33). It is important to determine individual changes in average deficit
in response to a reallocation of water in a trade to be able to mitigate them at the
watermaster level, if possible.
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Figure C.29: After trading for saved water under Agriculture Case 1, many users
experience a small increase in vulnerability (less than 15% compared to baseline).
One experiences a small decrease in vulnerability.
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Figure C.30: After trading for saved water under Agriculture Case 2, many users
experience a small increase in vulnerability (less than 15% compared to baseline).
192
Figure C.31: After trading for saved water under Municipal Case 1, two users expe-
rience a small increase in vulnerability (less than 15% compared to baseline).
193
Figure C.32: After trading for saved water under Municipal Case 3, one user experi-
ences a small increase in vulnerability (less than 15% compared to baseline).
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Figure C.33: After trading for saved water in a Dry Cooling Scenario for Power Plants
1–3, one user experiences a large decrease in vulnerability (more than 15% compared
to baseline).
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Figure C.34: After trading for saved water in a Dry Cooling Scenario for Power Plant
5, one user experiences a small increase in vulnerability (less than 15% compared to
baseline).
196
Figure C.35: After trading for saved water in a Dry Cooling Scenario for Power Plant
6, one user experiences a small increase in vulnerability (less than 15% compared to
baseline).
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